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"The problem [of Palestine] is mainly one of human relationship and
political rights. Few countries have been the subject of so many general or
detailed enquires ....
I. INTRODUCTION

While the United States has not been wholly immune from terrorism
in recent decades,2 the tragedy of September 11, 2001 awakened the
American conscience to the harsh reality that a new war between the

1. UNITED NATIONS, SPECIAL COMM. ON PALESTINE, REPORT ON PALESTINE

2. See, e.g.,

JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA

& DAVID G. COLEMAN,

V (1947).

DEPRESSION TO COLD WAR:

A

HISTORY OF AMERICA FROM HERBERT HOOVER TO RONALD REAGAN 240-43 (2002); George
Wilson, So We've Bloodied Qaddafi'sNose: Now What's Their Move?, WASH. POST, Mar. 30,

1986, at Dl.
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forces of democracy and fundamentalism had spread to American soil.3
September 11 was an attack against Americans not unlike the Palestinian
suicide bombings of Israeli civilians.4 The United States response to
terrorism has, in many ways, emulated Israel's attempts to protect its
citizens from acts of violence.5 The overwhelming response to Israel's
efforts, however, remains highly critical.6 Perhaps the most significant
repudiation of Israel's right to defend itself against Palestinian terror was
articulated by the International Court of Justice at the Hague (Hague
Court) on July 9, 2004.'

3. September 11 was a "nightmare scenario... [that] even the experts had not imagined."
Dan Balz, Bush Confronts a Nightmare Scenario: CrisisLooms as Defining Test of President's
Leadership,WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A2. Congress and the White House, "[s]tunned by the
magnitude of [the] terrorist attacks[,] ... reassess[ed] an approach to fighting terrorism that until
this week has favored the tools of law enforcement over those of war." John Lancaster & Susan
Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategyfor Coping With Terrorists:Policy Shift Would FavorMilitary
Action, Tribunal over PursuingSuspects Through American Courts, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 200 1,
at A9.
4. On September 12, one journalist wrote, "Do you get it now?... [Y]ou can't avoid the
question when... you have seen the human wreckage [in Israel] caused by the suicide bombs that
go off with sickening frequency. You ask it because Jerusalem offers a glimpse of what New York
may become." Clyde Haberman, When the UnimaginableHappens, and It's Right Outside Your
Window, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al0. Haberman added, "[Flear... grips Israelis... as the
ambulances keep coming, they reach for cell phones.., to make sure that loved ones are all right.
Often, they cannot get through because so many people are phoning at the same time.... All of
that happened in New York yesterday." Id.
5. The Israeli Supreme Court stated that Palestinian terrorism "embod[ies] all the
characteristics of armed conflict." H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Israel, at *3,
availableat http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html. President George W. Bush declared
that the September 11 attack and previous attacks "created a state of armed conflict." Military
Order ofNov. 13,2001, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
6. Despite condemnation of Israel's attempts to ensure its security, "[t]he world was quick
to welcome [American] strikes on Afghanistan ....
[There were few dissenting voices ..."How
the World Sees It; GlobalSupport as the War on Terror Begins, DAILY REc. (Scotland), Oct. 8,
2001, at 12. The U.N. General Assembly "[u]rgently call[ed] for international cooperation to bring
to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001 ." U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/L.1 (2001). The Security Council
expressed its "readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism." S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368(2001) (2001); see also John D. Becker, The Continuing
Relevance ofArticle 2(4): A Considerationof the Status of the U.N.Charter'sLimitations on the
Use of Force, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 583, 583 (2004) (noting "tacit support" for American
use of force based upon the customary international law of self-defense and Article 51 in the U.N.
Charter). Israel's justification of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, however, was
rejected by the International Court of Justice (Hague Court). See infra Part V.D.
7. See infra Parts IV.D, V, VI. The day the Hague Court issued its advisory opinion has
been described as "a dark day in the history of international law." 150 CONG. REc. H5465 (daily
ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pence).
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This Note assesses the legality of Israel's construction of a security
structure as part of its counterterrorism initiative.8 To discuss the Israeli
security structure in context, Part IIprovides a history of the Intifada and
Israel's recent campaign to defend itself from acts of terror against its
citizens. Part II traces the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
beginning in the early twentieth century, the development of the two-state
solution in Palestine, and the Arab-Israeli wars that reflected and defined
the region's volatile dynamic. 9 Part IV explores the relationship between
Israel and the United Nations (U.N.). Part V evaluates the Hague Court's
interpretation of international law principles relative to both the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and Israel's counterterrorism initiative. Lastly, Part VI
assesses the ramifications of the Hague Court's advisory opinion with
respect to the law of self-defense and the corpus of international law.
II. PALESTINIAN TERRORISM IN ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S
COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE' 0

Prior to 1988, both Palestinians and Israelis engaged in armed
struggle 1 that often resulted in "open warfare."' 2 The National Covenant
proclaiming the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 3
denounced Zionism 4 as colonialism and advocated the destruction of
Israel.'" At the conclusion of the 1967 Six-Day War,'6 the PLO emerged

8. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
9. The conflict has produced a rich oeuvre of scholarship and literature advancing both
perspectives. "Approaches to the Palestine question have varied in accordance with the beliefs and
ideologies of [those who] have sought to engage in and resolve it." ABD AL-FATTAH MUHAMMAD
EL-AWAISI, THE MUSLIM BROTHERS AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 1928-1947 1 (1998). This Note
does not attempt to advance one particular historical interpretation.
10. One scholar noted that "students of international law approach the question of a
Palestinian State from the standpoints ofterrorism, self-determination and human rights.... [Sluch
an approach is altogether reasonable." Louis Ren6 Beres, Implications ofa PalestinianStatefor
IsraeliSecurity andNuclear War: A JurisprudentialAssessment,17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 229, 229-30
(1999) (footnote call numbers omitted).
11. Thomas L. Friedman wrote that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) "want[s]
to use the 'armed struggle' to utterly destroy the peace process." Thomas L. Friedman, Hijackers
in Custody: A SpecialSatisfactionfor Israeland US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, § 1, at 10.
12. ANDREw S. BUCHANAN, PEACE WITH JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS § 1.2, at 3 (2000).
The author characterized the nature of the conflict as "inter-ethnic" and "existential": "The IsraeliPalestinian conflict, until 1988 .... failed to attain ... the destruction of the other side's claim to
legitimacy and to exist as a sovereign entity in the land of Israel/Palestine." Id.
13. On May 22, 1964, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser founded the PLO as a "political
umbrella organisation" controlling several groups that conducted raids into Israel. EDGAR
O'BALLANCE, THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA 4 (1998).
14. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
15. First Arab Palestine Cong., The PalestinianNationalCovenant (1964), in 1 PALESTINE:
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as the leader of an independent Palestinian liberation movement. 7 When
Palestinians mounted protests against Israel beginning in 1987, the PLO
"hurried to take charge ...and turn it into a PLO-directed civil resistance

movement."' 8
A. PalestinianMovements of Self-Determination, 1987-Present
While previous declarations recognized the Palestinian people,' 9
Palestinian national identity2° was defined in the Palestinian National
Charter of 1968.21 Following the Charter's adoption, "the number of
Palestinian resistance groups mushroomed."22 The primary objective of
these groups was to engage in acts of international terrorism against
Israelis23 in order to "publicise their cause."24 As many of these groups

DOCUMENTS 204,205 (Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi ed., 1997). The Covenant states, "[T]he establishment
of Israel [was] illegal and false .... [Tihe Palestine Liberation Organization carries out its
complete role to liberate Palestine." Id.
16. See infra Part III.D.
17. REUVEN KAMINER, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE
PALESTINIAN INTIFADA 25 (1996). For a discussion of the PLO's history and development, see
generally JILLIAN BECKER, THE PLO (1984), HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION (1984), and ABDALLAH FRANGI, THE PLO AND PALESTINE (Paul Knight trans.,
1983).
18. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 25.
19. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 302, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/302(IV) (1949)
(providing assistance to "Palestine refugees" after the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war); accordG.A.
Res. 212, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/212(III) (1948).
20. For a historical discussion of Palestinian national identity, see Omar M. Dajani, Stalled
Between Seasons: The InternationalLegalStatus ofPalestineDuringthe Interim Period,26 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 33-41 (1997).
21. Palestine Nat'l Council, The Palestinian National Charter (1968), in I PALESTINE:
DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 213, 213. The Charter recognized that the Palestinian people
possessed "the legal right to their homeland." Id. It added that "Palestinian identity is a genuine,
essential, and inherent characteristic" unaffected by "[t]he Zionist occupation." Id.The Charter
further recognized that "there is a Palestinian community ... [with a] material, spiritual, and
historical connection with Palestine." Id. The Charter noted that "Jews who had normally resided
in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." Id. But see
Chaim Herzog, Address General Assembly (Nov. 10, 1975), in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra
note 15, at 237, 239 (quoting PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat's opening address at a symposium in
Libya: "'There will be no presence in the region other than the Arab presence. ...
.' In other words,
in the Middle East from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf only one presence is allowed, and
that is Arab presence.").
22. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 5.
23. See, e.g., Terence Smith, Mrs. Meir Speaks: A Hushed ParliamentHears Her Assail
'LunaticActs,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1972, at 1 (noting that Palestinian guerillas targeted Israeli
citizens traveling abroad).
24. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 8.
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began to decline in the 1980s, several factors facilitated an atmosphere ripe
for Palestinians to develop a united protest movement against Israel.25
1. The First Palestinian Intifada
On December 8, 1987, several Palestinians were injured and killed in
a traffic accident with an Israeli vehicle near the Jebaliya refugee camp in
Gaza.26 The incident served as a catalyst for the first Intifada2 7 against
Israel's presence in both Gaza and the West Bank.28 The movement
"galvanized the Palestinian people, impressed international public opinion,
and, most importantly, convinced a sizeable number of Israelis that they
could not indefinitely maintain [a presence in] the West Bank and Gaza
strip."29 Over the course of approximately six years, Palestinians staged
mass demonstrations and engaged in acts of noncooperation against
Israel.3" In 1988, as the first Intifada gained momentum, the PLO declared

25. For a discussion of factors that scholars suggest facilitated a decline in the importance
of the PLO and its satellite networks between 1982 and 1987, see UzI AMIT-KOHN ET AL., ISRAEL,
THE "INTIFADA" AND THE RULE OF LAW 28-29 (1993). For a discussion of factors that contributed
to an atmosphere of unified Palestinian protest, see Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The
Relevance oflnternationalLaw to PalestinianRights in the West Bank and Gaza: In LegalDefense
of theIntifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 132 (1991).
26. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 26; Israeli Troops Kill 2 in Clashes with Arabs, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 10, 1987, at C13. Palestinians claimed that the accident was a deliberate act of Israeli
aggression. Id.
27. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 26. This "Intifada," or uprising, represented the first
significant and unified Palestinian attempt to protest Israel's presence in both Gaza and the West
Bank. See ANDREW RIGBY, LIVING THE INTIFADA 1 (1991). "Intifada" is derived from the Arabic
"Nafada," which means "the action of 'shaking off' or 'shaking out."' Id. at 2.
28. O'BALLANCE, supranote 13, at 26. The struggle rapidly spread to the West Bank within
twenty-four hours. Id. For a discussion of the historical antecedents to and causes of the first
Intifada, see RIGBY, supra note 27, at 1-17.
29. RASHID KHALIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN NATIONAL

201 (1997). The Intifada "constituted a... new form of interethnic crisis between
Israel and the Palestinians." HEMDA BEN-YEHUDA & SHMUEL SANDLER, THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT TRANSFORMED: FIFTY YEARS OF INTERSTATE AND ETHNIC CRISES 141 (2002).
30. Palestinian resistance included rock throwing, demonstrations, and the construction of
illegal roadblocks. AMIT-KOHN ETAL., supranote 25, at27. Although both Israelis and Palestinians
incurred casualties, the first Intifada has nonetheless been characterized as an "unarmed form of
resistance, insofar as the tools of confrontation used by the Palestinians have not been lethal."
RIGBY, supra note 27, at 1. As a political and social movement, the first Intifada was "an
was an unprecedented level
unprecedented, full-scale civilian uprising... and the main weapon ...
of mass participation in every conceivable act of resistance .... The emerging Intifada was
basically non-violent ....An unarmed civilian population ... confront[ed] an army ... and
create[ed]... an alternative source of power." KAMINER, supra note 17, at 42. As a result, the first
lntifada has been referred to as "the war of stones." Nationmaster.com, Encyclopedia: First
Intifada, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/First-Intifada (last visited May 9, 2005).
CONSCIOUSNESS
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Palestinian independence.31 When the first Intifada formally concluded in
1993,32 an era of peaceful co-existence and an end to decades of violence
between Palestinians and Israelis seemed forthcoming.33
2. Violence in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, 1993-2000
34
As the 1990s progressed, the peace process that seemed within reach
rapidly began to unravel.35 In April 1994, the first in a series of suicide
bombings that continued throughout the 1990S36 and into the new
millennium erupted within the West Bank and Israel. Assassinations of

31. See Louis Ren6 Beres, The Oslo Agreements in InternationalLaw, Natural Law, and
World Politics, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 715, 736 n.85 (1997). The PLO "was called upon to
put aside" its declaration of statehood as a prerequisite to peace negotiations. Camille Mansour, The
Palestinian-IsraeliPeace Negotiations:An Overview andAssessment, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring
1993, at 5, 6.
32. The PLO and Israeli Government exchanged letters of mutual recognition in 1993.
Chairman Arafat wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin that the PLO "recognizes the right of the
State of Israel to exist in peace and security," "commits itself to the Middle East peace process,"
and "renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence." Letter from Yassar Arafat,
Chairman, PLO, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister, Israel (Sept. 9, 1993), in 2 PALESTINE:
DOCUMENTS, supranote 15, at 142, 142. In response, Prime Minister Rabin stated that Israel would
"recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people" and negotiate with it to achieve
peace in the region. Letter from Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister, Israel, to Yassar Arafat, Chairman,
PLO (Sept. 9, 1993), in id. at 142, 142; see O'BALLANCE, supranote 13, at 157 (stating that Arafat
"wanted the Intifada to end"). At least one Palestinian characterized the unilateral cancellation of
the Intifada, as well as the PLO's recognition of Israel, as a "series of renunciations of the PLO
Charter, of violence and terrorism." BUCHANAN, supra note 12, at 215.
33. Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Authority (Oslo Accords) in 1993. See U.S. President Bill Clinton, Statement at the Signing of the
Israel-PLO Accord (Sept. 13, 1993), in 2 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 150, 150-51
("[T]here is a great yearning for [peace].").
34. Both parties slowly implemented the Oslo Accords. See O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at
175, 179. Israeli troop redeployment in anticipation of full withdrawal from Gaza was scheduled
to take place shortly thereafter. Steve Rodan, Agreement Not to DisagreeKeeps Meeting Friendly,
JERUSALEM POST, May 12, 1995, at 11.
35. The militant Palestinian group Hamas claimed responsibility for attacks that resulted in
at least eighteen Israeli deaths within the first three months of the Oslo Accords. David Hoffmhan,
PalestinianMilitants'Exilein LebanonEnds:Rabin'sMove Failedto Break Hamas, WASH. POST,
Dec. 16, 1993, at A35.
36. See O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 171-79; Bob Hepburn, Israel Seals off West Bank,
Gaza Arab Militants Vow More Attacks, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 8, 1994, at Al; Bill Hutman & Alon
Pinkas, Terrorist Was WantedHamas Member, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at 1. Following an
October 1994 suicide bombing, a terrorism expert stated: "For this atrocity to happen in the heart
of Tel Aviv means that the arm of terrorism is long" and that Hamas "appears to be willing to take
greater risks ... to weaken the peace process." David Rudge, Newsline with Prof Yonah Alexander,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 20, 1994, at 2. For further descriptions of numerous suicide bombings in
Israel between 1994 and 1998, see Israel Foreign Ministry, Suicide Bombings, available at
http://www.aish.com/Israel/articles/SuicideBombings_p.asp (last visited May 9, 2005).
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both Palestinian 37 and Israeli38 leaders, discontent among Palestinians with
their own leadership,39 and a breakdown in negotiations between Israeli
and Palestinian officials4" contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty that
weakened any prospect for peace.41
3. The Second Palestinian Intifada
The causes of the second Intifada4 2 remain in dispute.43 Although the
second Intifadamirrored its predecessor by featuring "thousands of Arabs
hurling rocks, burning tires, and blocking highways," it became
increasingly violent." The second Intifada incorporated the use of suicide
bombings45 designed to inflict casualties among Israeli civilians. 6 In 2002,

37. Israelis assassinated leaders of the Fatah Black Hawks, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas militant
groups in 1995 and 1996. O'BALLANCE, supra note 13, at 194, 198, 201.
38. Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli while he attended a peace rally in
November 1995. Id. at 199; see Serge Schmemann, The Israeli Vote. The Overview: Netanyahu,
Set to Lead Israel,to Seek 'Peacewith Security,' N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at Al. Palestinian
responses to Rabin's death were mixed. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Assassination in Israel: The
Palestinians:In the West Bank and Gaza, Mixed Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at Al 1.
Despite the prospects of concluding a permanent peace after the 1993 Oslo Accords, "hope died
with Rabin in 1995." Ofer Zur, Time for a Wall, TIKKuN, May/June 2002, at 20, 20.
39. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Gaza Deaths Spur Unrest. Israeli Troops Kill Three, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1994, § National/Foreign, at 1 (reporting clashes between Palestinian police and
stone-throwing Palestinian youths outside a Gaza mosque); Charles W. Holmes, Can Arafat Make
Peace Work? PalestiniansHave New Enemy-Each Other-asPLO ChiefFightsMilitants,ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Nov. 20, 1994, at A13.

40. See, e.g., Dore Gold, Closingthe Deal, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 22, 2000, at 3B (noting
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's willingness to make concessions during the 2000 Camp David
Summit and Chairman Arafat's refusal to reach an agreement); Leslie Susser, Digging In,
JERUSALEM REP., Dec. 18, 2000, at 12 (citing reasons for the Summit's collapse).
41. David Makovsky wrote that any resolution to the conflict "seem[ed] out of reach for the
foreseeable future" and that "the upsurge in Palestinian violence.., has only exacerbated these
sentiments." DAVID MAKOVSKY, A DEFENSIBLE FENCE: FIGHTING TERROR AND ENABLING A TwoSTATE SOLUTION, at xv (2004).

42. The second Intifada became known as the al-Aqsa lnti/ada because Palestinians traced
its origin to the date on which current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon entered the al-Aqsa
mosque in Jerusalem, which Muslims regard as the third most holy site in Islam. Aljazeera, The
Second Intifada, at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ED8317B4-626C-498B-8AD2-F9274
D5 10D99.htm (last visited May 9, 2005).
43. Israel claimed that the second Intifada was preplanned by the Palestinian Authority and
commenced after the breakdown of the Camp David Summit during the summer of 2000. See
generally SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMM., SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMM.

REPORT (2001), availableathttp://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Mitchellrep.html;
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
44. DANIEL DOR, INTIFADA HITS THE HEADLINES 18 (2004).

45. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) cited a total of 22,406 Palestinian terrorist attacks since
the second Inti/adabegan. Israel Defense Forces, Total ofAttacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and
Home FrontSince September2000,availableathttp://wwwl .idf.il/SIPSTORAGE/DOVER/files/
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the Israeli Supreme Court described the all-encompassing reach of the
attacks: "These suicide bombers reach every place where Israelis are to be
'
found."47
48
B. Israel's CounterterrorismInitiative

The notion of "physically separating the Israeli and Palestinian peoples
' Israel responded to the second Palestinian Intifada and the
is an old one."49
accompanying terrorist attacks5" by erecting a security structure separating
Israel from the West Bank and Gaza beginning in 2000." According to the

9/21829.doc (last updated July 24, 2004). For a list of terrorist and suicide attacks in Israel from
1994 through 2002, see HA'ARETZ, Chronology of Suicide Bombings in Israel, available at
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtmnl?itemNo=209646&contrassID=2&subContrass
ID= 1&sbSubContrasslD=0&IistSrc=Y (last visited May 9, 2005).
46. At least four thousand Palestinians have sacrificed themselves as part of the ongoing
struggle. Steven Stalinsky, The Intifada, 5 Years Later, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 6, 2004, at 9. A 2004 poll
of Palestinians revealed that seventy percent of those surveyed supported continuing the conflict
against Israel, forty-six percent sought to eliminate Israel and replace it with Palestine, and sixtytwo percent supported the use of suicide bombings to further Palestinian objectives. Caroline B.
Glick, Supreme Injustice, JERUSALEM POST, July 2, 2004, at 1. Palestinian leaders have endorsed
suicide attacks "as a legitimate weapon of resistance." Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and
InternationalLaw, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 297, 312 (2003).
47. H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander, 56(6) P.D. 352, at *2, available at
http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html. The court added, "Palestinians use... guided
human bombs. These suicide bombers .... are terrorists [who] hide among the civilian Palestinian
population in the territories... they are supported by part of the civilian population, and by their
families." Id.
48. The terms used to describe Israel's security structure depend upon whether it is being
referred to by those who support it or by those who oppose it. Opponents employ the term "wall"
to accentuate portions of the structure that appear permanent in nature. See, e.g., THE WALL IN
PALESTINE: FACTS, TESTIMONIES, ANALYSIS AND CALL TO ACTION 10-13 (Palestinian
Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON) ed., 2003). But see DORON ALMOG, THE WEST BANK

3 n.4 (Wash. Inst. Policy Focus,
No. 47, 2004) (stating that walls comprise only 8.5 kilometers of the entire structure); infra notes
56-58, 64 and accompanying text. Proponents of the structure utilize the term "fence." See, e.g.,
David Makovsky, A Fence That Makes Sense: The BarrierProtectsIsrael While Pointingto a TwoState Solution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at B 15. The legal question presented to the Hague Court
by the General Assembly utilized the term "wall." See infra note 207 and accompanying text. A
physical description of the structure is contained in Part II.B.2. In an effort to maintain objectivity,
this Note uses the terms "counterterrorism initiative" and "security structure."
49. MAKOVSKY, supra note 41, at 3; see infra Part III.B.
50. Approximately 900 Israelis were killed between September 2000 and March 2004 as a
result of Palestinian terrorism. ALMOG, supra note 48, at 1. The Israeli Supreme Court noted that
over "6000 were injured, some with serious wounds that have left [victims] severely handicapped."
H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Israel, at *2, availableat http://62.90.71.124/
eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html.
51. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
FENCE: A VITAL COMPONENT IN ISRAEL'S STRATEGY OF DEFENSE
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Israeli Supreme Court, the "separation fence is a project of utmost national
importance."52
1. Recognizing the Need for a Security Structure
Prime Minister Rabin, in response to a suicide bombing in 1994,
asserted, "'There has to be a separation, not just a technical closure ....
We have to decide on separation as a philosophy."' 53 Israel subsequently
erected an electronic fence around the Gaza Strip pursuant to military
deployment requirements set forth under the Oslo Accords, but it was
demolished when the second Intifadaerupted in 2000.14 In July 2000, prior
to the start of the second Intifada, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
emphasized that a physical separation between Israel and the Palestinians
would mutually benefit both nations.55 Shortly thereafter, the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) adopted a philosophy of "separation between the
two entities together with . . . cooperation" 56 while simultaneously

constructing "'a border
that breathes"57 in order to recognize Palestinian
58
concerns and needs.
Although current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon originally opposed
constructing a security structure, he succumbed to growing public
sentiments demanding protection against suicide bombings. 9 A poll of
Israelis found that eighty-four percent of those surveyed supported the
construction of a security structure. 60 Most Israelis were united in their
confidence that such an initiative would significantly reduce the number
of terrorist attacks and violence perpetrated against them.6
52. Beit Sourik Vill. Council, at *8.
53. David Makovsky, Rabin: We NeedBorderwith Palestinians,JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 20,
1994, at 1 (quoting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin). In 1995, Rabin declared "This path must
lead to a separation .... We do not want.. . residents of the State of Israel ... subject[ed] to
terrorism." Rabin:Peace "MustLeadto a Separation"Between IsraelisandPalestinians,MIDEAST
MIRROR (London), Jan. 24, 1995, LEXIS, World News, Middle East/Africa Sources. Rabin was
assassinated ten months later. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54. ALMOG, supranote 48, at xi; see also MAKOVSKY, supranote 41, at 7.
55. Before Barak departed for the Camp David Summit in 2000, he stated,
"[S]eparation... will promote a healthier relationship as well as economic and multi-disciplinary
collaboration .... Israel's welfare is linked to the prosperity of the Palestinian people." Prime
Minister Ehud Barak, Address to the "Peace and Security Council, Peace as My Paramount
Objective, MIDEAST MIRROR, June 28, 2000, LEXIS, World News, Middle East/Africa Sources.
56. Israel Plans to Build Fence Along Border with Palestinians,XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
June 21, 2000, LEXIS, World News, Political.
57. Hanan Sher, SeparateBut Unequal, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 20, 2000, at 80.
58. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
59. See MAKOVSKY, supra note 41, at 7.
60. Ephraim Yaar & Tamar Hermann, Peace Index: February2004, at http://spirit.tau.ac.il/
socant/peace/peaceindex/2004/files/feb2004e.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005).
61. Id.
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2. Elements of the Israeli Security Structure
On April 14, 2002, the Ministers' Committee for National Security
authorized the IDF to commence construction of the structure.62 The Israeli
Supreme Court noted that careful consideration was given to Palestinian
interests when the Israeli Government determined the location and
composition of the security structure.63 The structure included an elaborate
network of electronic fences, a bulldozed security buffer zone, high-tech
sensors equipped with interception capabilities, electronically enhanced
observation posts, patrol roads, a "trace" road composed of sand to detect
footprints, barbed wire, and secured gates designed to ensure safe
passage.' While no security measure could be entirely impenetrable,65
recent evidence suggests that this elaborate security network has been

62. The Minister's Committee sought to "strengthen operational capability in the framework
of fighting terror, and to prevent the penetration of terrorists ... into Israel." H.C. 2056/04, Beit
Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Israel, at *3, availableat http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/frameset
Srch.html. The structure was designed as "a temporary solution" to "help contend with the threat
of Palestinian terror." Id. at *3, *16; see also Ministry of Defence, Israel's Security Fence:
Purpose, at http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm (last updated July 1,
2004) (last visited May 14, 2005).
63. "[I]n planning the route of the separation fence, great weight was given to the interests
of the residents of the area." Beit Sourik Vill. Council,at *8. The court elaborated, "[C]onsideration
is given to ... Palestinian[s] and.., the needs of the residents." Id at *8-9. The court assessed
whether the "'least injurious' means" were implemented to protect Palestinian interests: "[Tihe
proportionality of the [structure's] route ... relates to the severity of the injury caused to... local
inhabitants." Id. at *26, *29. The question was, "[I]s the injury caused to local
inhabitants ... proportionate, or is it ... possible to satisfy ... security considerations while
establishing a fence route whose injury to the local inhabitants is lesser?" Id at *30. Based upon
evidence presented in the Beit Sourik Village Council case, the court ordered the relocation of a
portion of the structure's route because its position was "not proportionate." Id. at *35; see also
Mark D. Allison, Note, The HamasDeportation:Israel'sResponse to Terrorism Duringthe Middle
East Peace Process, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 433-36 (1994) (discussing the Israeli
Supreme Court's standard of proportionality). Ruth Wedgwood acknowledged that "[t]he fence
presents hard questions of proportionality and balancing." Ruth Wedgwood, Ill-AdvisedAdvisory,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2004, at A14. But see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1072 (I.C.J. 2004) [hereinafter Legal
Consequences] (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) (noting the Hague Court's failure to apply
the proportionality test).
64. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1033; ALMOG, supra note 48, at 8;
MAKOVSKY, supra note 41, at 27. For a visual cross-section of the security structure, see Ministry
of Defence, Israel'sSecurity Fence: OperationalConcept, at http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.
il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2005) (last visited May 14, 2005).
65. MAKOVSKY, supranote 41, at 17 (stating that although "terrorists may still find ways to
circumvent the West Bank fence ... even a less-than-perfect success rate would still save many
lives").
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effective.66 As of July 2004, Israel reported a ninety percent decrease in
terrorist attacks and a seventy percent decrease in terrorist-related deaths.67
IlI. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS DEFINING THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT

The juxtaposition of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples68 lies at the
heart of the conflict.69 While Arabs and Jews coexisted in a state of mutual
cooperation under Ottoman rule during the close of the nineteenth
century,7 ° the last century witnessed their violent collision over Palestine.
Notwithstanding Biblical commands to the contrary,7' the idea to separate
the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, whether
by a security structure or by
72
other permanent means, "is an old one.,
A. Zionist Aspirations and Mandatory Palestine
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict "is one of the most complex of our
time., 73 This reality is due, in part, to the historical importance of the
territory for peoples of both Jewish and Muslim faiths.74 In the waning
years of the nineteenth century, European Jews founded a political76
movement 75 designed to re-establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

66. Id. Attempts to infiltrate Israeli population centers from the West Bank decreased by
approximately ninety-five percent since the structure's construction. Id.
67. Editorial, The UN's Blinkers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 22, 2004, at A14.
68. The common ancestry of both nations is described in Scripture: "I will make them one
nation in the land, on the mountains of Israel.... [A]nd they will never again be two nations or be
divided into two kingdoms." Ezekiel 37:22 (New International).
69. Jill Allison Weiner, Comment, Israel,Palestine,and the Oslo Accords, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 230, 230 (1999).
70. See HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR
TIME 163-64 (1979).
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. MAKOVSKY, supranote 41, at 3.
73. Barry A. Feinstein & Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good
Neighbors: Improvinga Seemingly IntractableBorderConflict Between IsraelisandPalestinians,
16 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
74. "Both sides feel that they have a legitimate, exclusive claim over the same piece of land
in the Middle East." Id. at 3. Abraham, "considered by Jews to be [the] first Jew and by Muslims
to be [the] first Muslim," bore Isaac and Ishmael, of whom Jews and Muslims believe they are
descendants, respectively. Weiner, supra note 69, at 230 n.4. The Lord told Abraham, "To your
offspring I will give" the land of Canaan. Genesis 12:4-7 (New International). As such, "both sides
stubbornly believe that their own religion and history has given them the right to the land." Jasmine
Jordaan, Note, Proposalof Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for the Israeli-PalestinianInterim
Agreement: A Crucial Step in EstablishingLong-Term Economic Stability in Palestine and a
Lasting Peace, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 555, 555 (1997).
75. Zionism "is an international political movement which aspires to link all Jews... into
a...
political and cultural centre [in] the state of Israel." SAMI HADAWI, BITTER HARVEST:
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Palestinian Arabs simultaneously began forging a national identity
separate and distinct from other Arabs in the region.77 An increased
presence of Jewish settlers in Palestine,78 the British Government's
political promises to Zionist leaders,79 and the creation of Transjordan in
192380 heightened tensions between Jews and Palestinian Arabs. 81
B. The Derivationof a Two-State Solution
The modern history of the Middle East can be described as one of 82a
series of divisions. The first occurred when Britain and France
implemented the Sykes-Picot Agreement83 after World War I. The Balfour

PALESTINE BETWEEN 1914-1979, at 30 (Caravan Books 1983) (1967). "'Zionism strives to create
for the Jewish people a Home in Palestine secured by public law."' UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
COMM. ON PALESTINE, supra note 1, at 103 n. 103 (quoting an English translation of the Bagle
Program of 1897).
76. MARTIN GILBERT, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 3, 16 (1998). For a discussion of political Zionism,
see MARK TESSLER, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELi-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 7-68 (1994). Zionism
inspired Jewish immigrants to arrive steadily in Palestine throughout the early part of the twentieth
century. See George E. Bisharat, Land,Law, andLegitimacyin Israelandthe Occupied Territories,
43 AM. U. L. REv. 467,476-502 (1994) (recounting a history ofJewish land acquisition in Palestine
prior to 1948 and suggesting that "'the conquest of land' was one of the pillars of the Zionist
effort"). But see JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH
CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE 101 (1984) (arguing that the conception that Jews expelled Arabs from
their lands was a "myth" because "Arabs were immigrating to Israel, as much as the Jews").
77. Palestinian nationalism developed separately from a larger Arab nationalist movement.
See MUHAMMAD Y. MUSIH, THE ORIGINS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM, at x (1988).
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. The Balfour Declaration committed Britain to "the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people." Letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov.
2, 1917), in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 22, 22. For a discussion of the legal
ramifications of the Balfour Declaration, see JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, THE JEWISH PLAN
FOR PALESTINE: MEMORANDA AND STATEMENTS 70-82 (1947) [hereinafter THE JEWISH PLAN FOR
PALESTINE]. For a Palestinian perspective on the Balfour Declaration, see HADAWI, supranote 75,
at 13-15.
80. The Allies' partition of the Ottoman Empire facilitated the creation of the Palestine
Mandate. See Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supranote 15, at 20,
20; SACHAR, supra note 70, at 95 (depicting a map of the region under the Sykes-Picot Agreement).
In 1923, the British Government reorganized Transjordan and, as a result, "Transjordan and
Palestine ... evolved in very different ways. The latter became the scene of increasingly bitter
confrontations between Jews and Arabs." TESSLER, supra note 76, at 164-65. For a critique of the
legal validity of the Palestine Mandate, see HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAEu CONFLICT 65-68 (2d ed. 1976).
81. For a discussion of violence during the Palestine Mandate, see generally J. BOWYER
BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION (1977).
82. Even before the Allies defeated the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople administered
Palestine by dividing the territory into geographical sub-units. Bisharat, supra note 76, at 471 n.6.
83. See supranote 80 and accompanying text. Despite assurances by Britain that it would
support Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire, the "secret" agreement between France and
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Declaration facilitated a second division. 4 On two separate occasions,
preceding and following World War H, European governments attempted
to divide Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. Ultimately,
these efforts led to the outbreak of a series of hostilities that began in 1948
and continue today.
1. The Peel Commission Partition Plan of 193785
The modem dilemma in Palestine "started with the adoption by the
United Nations [in 1947] of the Palestine partition plan which provided for
the establishment of a 'Jewish state,' an 'Arab state,' and an 'International
Zone of Jerusalem."' 86 The two-state solution had been first articulated ten
years prior in the Peel Commission Partition Plan of 1937.87 The Peel
Commission Plan was ultimately set aside due to British concerns over
implementation88 and the practical need to gain both Jewish and Arab
support for the Allies against the Axis Powers.89
2. The United Nations Partition Resolution of 194790
Resistance against British Mandatory rule in Palestine escalated
between 1945 and 1947, 9 ' as did clashes between Palestinian Jews and
Arabs. 92 In 1947, the British Government recognized the "unworkable"
Britain "conflicted with Arab aspirations" in the region. HADAWI, supra note 75, at 15.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Palestinians viewed the Balfour Declaration
as the "signing away to the Jews Arab rights in Palestine." HADAWI, supra note 75, at 15.
85. For a map depicting land designations and borders under the Peel Commission Partition
Plan, see GILBERT, supra note 76, at 626.
86. PALESTINE PARTITIONED 1947-1958 (EXCERPTS & DOCUMENTS) 2 (Sami Hadawi ed.,
1959); see infra Part III.B.2.
87. The Commission acknowledged that the British Mandate presented "no possibility of
solving the Palestine problem." Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission) (July
7, 1937), excerpted in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 99, 99. The Commission
recommended the establishment of a new mandate over Jerusalem and Bethlehem, an independent
Jewish state comprising part of Palestine, and an independent Arab state comprising part of
Palestine and Transjordan. Id.
88. SACHAR, supra note 70, at 217-19. The Woodhead Commission was established by the
British Government in 1938 to assess the viability of partitioning Palestine. Id. at 217. The
Commission concluded "that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the
proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution
of the problem is impracticable." Palestine Partition Commission: British Policy Statement Against
Partition, excerpted in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 104, 104-05.
89. See SACHAR, supra note 70, at 227-29; NAT'L STUDIES ON INT'L ORG., ISRAEL AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 21-22 (1956).
90. For a map depicting the U.N. Partition Plan, see GILBERT, supra note 76, at 629.
91. See BELL, supranote 81, at 140-252.
92. Id. at 254-313. Pre-1948 violence has been referred to as the "unofficial" war. Avi
SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 28 (2000).
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nature of the mandate and referred the matter to the U.N. 93 The U.N.
formed the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to seek a viable
resolution to the conflict.94 UNSCOP's initial recommendations included
the termination of the Palestine Mandate95 and the grant of Palestinian
independence96 "at the earliest practicable date," 97 the establishment of a
"transitional period preceding the grant of independence in Palestine"
under U.N. auspices, 9 the preservation of democratic principles and
protection of minorities, 99 and the cessation of violence in the region. 00 On
November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 181,
which provided for the end of the mandate and partition of Palestine into
independent Jewish and Arab states alongside a special international
regime for Jerusalem.'0 '
C. The FirstArab-Israeli War of 1948
Both the Arab and British responses to the U.N. Partition Resolution
were negative. 0 2 Jewish leaders generally supported the recommendation

93. FRANK GERVASI, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 72 (1967); UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMM. ON
PALESTINE, supra note 1, at 1; David John Ball, Note, Toss the Travaux?: Application of Fourth
Geneva Convention to the Middle East Conflict-A Modem (Re)assessment, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
990, 993-94 (2004).
94. UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMM. ON PALESTINE, supranote 1, at 1-8.
95. Id.at 140.
96. Id.at 142.
97. Id.at 140, 142.
98. Id. at 143-44.
99. Id. at 148-49.
100. Id. at 153. For a critique of the UNSCOP Report, see MARTIN JONES, FAILURE IN
PALESTINE: BRITISH AND UNITED STATES POLICY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 282-307
(1986).
101. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 322-43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(11)
(1947). The resolution stipulated, "When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish
State ...has become effective... sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for
admission to membership in the United Nations." Id.The resolution detailed boundaries of separate
Arab and Jewish states as well as territory surrounding Jerusalem that "shall be established as a
corpus separatum under a special international regime" administered by the U.N. Id.
102. Arabs rejected the resolution on the grounds that it violated the U.N. Charter and
established a Jewish state with a Jewish government presiding over Arab ownership of
approximately ninety percent of the state's land. HADAWI, supra note 75, at 73; see PALESTINE
PARTITIONED 1947-1958 (EXCERPTS & DOCUMENTS), supra note 86, at 2. But see MITCHELL G.
BARD, MYTHS AND FACTS: A GUIDE TO THE ARAB-ISRAELi CONFLICT 34-35 (2002) (stating that an
Arab majority existed throughout Palestine and that over seventy percent of the land that became
Israel in 1948 belonged to the Mandate government, not Arab landowners). In response to the
resolution, the British government refused to cooperate in order "to avoid provoking the Arab
world.., when Britain's foothold in the Middle East was already precarious." SACHAR, supra note
70, at 296.
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for partition.° 3 Violence immediately escalated between Palestinian Jews
and Arabs,"° and the British Mandatory Government contemplated
advancing the timeline for its withdrawal of forces from the region." 5 The
U.N. Security Council established a Truce Commission 0 6 and adopted
several resolutions calling for a restoration of order. 0 7 On May 14, 1948,
one day prior to the anticipated termination of the British Mandate over
Palestine, Jewish leaders proclaimed the establishment of the State of
Israel"08 within territories designated for a Jewish state under the U.N.
Partition Plan. 19
The War of 1948110 engaged regular military forces from Egypt,
Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, "irregular" Palestinian forces, the Arab
Liberation Army sponsored by the Arab League, and the IDF.1"' Between
May and December 1948 the U.N. Security Council issued nine
resolutions urging cease-fires and diplomatic solutions to the conflict."'

103. Letter from Dr. Chaim Weizmann to the Chairman of UNSCOP (July 14, 1947), in THE
supra note 79, at 556, 559 ("[E]quality and independence can be
reconciled.., with co-operation between a Jewish State and as many Arab States as will wish to
collaborate with it... for the benefit of the area as a whole.").
104. See TESSLER, supra note 76, at 261. The British Government believed that war was "the
only way that any stable settlement could be reached." JONES, supranote 100, at 308-09.
105. JONES, supra note 100, at 320.
106. S.C. Res. 48, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/48(1948) (1948).
107. See S.C. Res. 46, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 283d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/46(1948) (1948);
S.C. Res. 43, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 277th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/43(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 42,
U.N. SCOR, 2d sess., 263d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/42(1948) (1948).
108. The declaration stated, "We hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State in
Palestine ...which shall be known as Israel." Israeli Proclamation of Independence (May 14,
1948), in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 185, 185-86. A Palestinian Proclamation of
Independence was issued by the Palestine Arab Higher Committee approximately five months later:
"[T]he Arab people of Palestine... proclaim.., the full independence of... Palestine as bounded
by Syria and Lebanon from the north, by Syria and Transjordan from the east, by the Mediterranean
from the west, and by Egypt from the south." Palestine Arab Higher Comm., Palestinian
Proclamation of Independence, in 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 189, 189-90.
109. TESSLER, supra note 76, at 263; Weiner, supra note 69, at 234.
110. Israelis refer to the conflict as their War of Independence, whereas Arabs describe it as
"al-Nakba," or "the disaster." SHLAIM, supra note 92, at 28; see TESSLER, supra note 76, at 273.
111. SHLAIM, supra note 92, at 34.
112. S.C. Res. 66, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 396th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/66(1948) (1948); S.C.
Res. 62, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 381st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/62(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 61, U.N.
SCOR, 3d Sess., 377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/61(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 59, U.N. SCOR, 3d
Sess., 367th mtg., U.N. Doc. S[RES/59(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 56, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 354th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/56(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 54, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 338th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/54(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 53, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 331st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/53(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 50, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 310th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/50(1948) (1948); S.C. Res. 49, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 302d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/49(1948)
(1948).
JEWISH PLAN FOR PALESTINE,
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When armistice agreements were concluded in 1949,113 Israel had
increased its territory by approximately twenty percent over those lands
designated for a Jewish state under the Partition Plan. 1 4 Territories of
Palestine that did not become part of Israel "fell under the control of
neighboring Arab states.""' 5 The border between Israel and Jordan, as
contained in the General Armistice Agreement concluded between the two
nations on April 3, 1949,16 has been commonly referred to as the "Green
Line," which separated Israel from the West Bank between 1949 and
1967." Notwithstanding an undeclared war of attrition during the 1950s
and 1960s, as well as a brief war between Israel and Egypt over access to

113. The armistice agreements were intended "as temporarymeasures rapidly to be replaced
by permanent peace treaties." GERVASI, supra note 93, at 99. The "nonbinding nature of the
armistice agreements left them devoid of legal or practical force." Ball, supranote 93, at 995. The
Arab states' refusal to recognize and directly negotiate with Israel contributed to the failure of
concluding permanent peace treaties. See GERVASI, supra note 93, at 101. Consequently, no peace
ensued: "The 1949 armistice agreements ....
were signed 'in order to facilitate the transition from
the present truce to permanent peace' ....[but] the state of war continued." MORDECHAI NiSAN,
ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES: A STUDY IN CONTROL 1967-1977, at 11-12 (1978) (quoting the

armstice agreements); see generallyDavid M. Morriss, From War to Peace:A Study of Cease-Fire
Agreements andthe Evolving Role of the UnitedNations, 36 VA.J. INT'LL. 801 (1996) (discussing
the legal significance of U.N. armistice agreements). A Palestinian perspective on the 1949
armistice agreements is contained inHADAWI, supra note 75, at 92-119.
114. SACHAR, supra note 70, at 350. No legal distinction had been made between territory
designated for the Jewish state under the Partition Plan and territory Israel incorporated into its
borders following the 1948 war. TESSLER, supra note 76, at 273. The attack against Israel during
the war "did justify Israeli defensive measures, both within and as necessary, without the
boundaries allotted her by the partition plan." Stephen M. Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 346 (1970). Palestinians cited a loss of seventy-eight percent of Palestinian
territory under the Partition Plan after "ultimate defeat" in the 1948 war. Written Statement
Submitted by Palestine, (Legal Consequences,supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at *42, availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement08Palestine.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2005).
115. TESSLER, supra note 76, at 275. At the conclusion of the conflict, Egypt occupied Gaza
but never claimed sovereignty over the territory. See John Quigley, JudicialAutonomy in Palestine:
ProblemsandProspects,21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 697, 704 (1996). Egypt never applied its own law
in Gaza and deemed itself a belligerent occupant. Carol Farhi, On the Legal Status of the Gaza
Strip, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, at
61, 74-76 (1982). Transjordan assumed control over East Jerusalem and annexed the West Bank,
a measure that was condemned by the Arab League as a violation of international law. R. R.
PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 942 (8th ed. 1995); Ball, supranote

93, at 996; see infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
116. General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Jordan-Isr., 42 U.N.T.S. 304.
117. Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety (Legal
Consequences, supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at *38, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement_17_Israel.pdf(last visited May
9, 2005); see also BARD, supra note 102, at 284.
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the Suez Canal in 1956,18 no territorial changes occurred in the Middle
East until 1967.
D. The Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967"9
Despite the 1949 armistice agreements,2 the 1956 Suez crisis 2 ' and
numerous border skirmishes prior to 1967 contributed to a "tense and
explosive" situation.'22 Pronouncements by Arab leaders throughout the
1960s,'2 3 coupled with aerial engagements between the Syrian and Israeli

air forces in the Spring of 1967, suggested the imminence of another ArabIsraeli conflict.' 24 The Six-Day War officially commenced on June 5,
1967, when Arab armies"' initiated a campaign against Israel."2 6

118. After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the Security Council called for "free and open
transit through the Canal without discrimination." S.C. Res. 118, U.N. SCOR, 1lth Sess., 743d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 18(1956) (1956). Israeli troops crossed into the Sinai Peninsula but later
withdrew. See BARD,supra note 102, at 49-50; SHLAIM, supra note 92, at 178-85.
119. The Six-Day War had "the most wide-ranging political transformation in the Middle East
since 1948." Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 79 (2003).
120. See supranotes 113, 116 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. CATTAN, supra note 80, at 25; see GILBERT, supra note 76, at 361-68.

123. In 1960, Egyptian leader Gamal abdel-Nasser addressed the General Assembly: "'The
only solution to Palestine is... the annulment of Israel's existence."' SACHAR, supra note 70, at
615 (quoting Gamal abdel-Nasser, Address Before the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 1960)); see
also Uri Shoham, Note, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in the
Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1996) (quoting statements by Nasser and other Arab
leaders calling for the destruction of Israel). One week before the outbreak of war in 1967, the
Jordanian representative to the Security Council noted that the 1949 armistice agreement "fixed the
demarcation line" but "did not fix boundaries." NISAN, supranote 113, at 12; see supra notes 113,
116, and accompanying text.
124. See SACHAR, supranote 70, at 615-20. Egypt permitted U.N. Emergency Forces (UNEF)
within its territory after the 1956 war but expelled them in May 1967. GILBERT, supra note 76, at
366; see also OCCASIONAL PAPERS: ARAB POSITIONS CONCERNING THE FRONTIERS OF ISRAEL 15

(Ruth Kedar trans., Alouph Hareven ed., 1977); MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 33-126 (2002) (providing an in-depth discussion
of events that led to the outbreak of the war).
125. Military forces from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan fought against the IDF.
Weiner, supranote 69, at 235.
126. See id.; Schwebel, supra note 114, at 346 (arguing that the facts demonstrate that Israel
waged a defensive war). But see John Quigley, Identifying the Origins ofAnti-American Terrorism,
56 FLA. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2004) (suggesting that Israel attacked first). The Security Council
issued four separate resolutions demanding immediate cease-fires during the course of the shortlived conflict. S.C. Res. 236, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1357th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/236(1967)
(1967); S.C. Res. 235, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1352d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/235(1967) (1967);
S.C. Res. 234, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1350th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/234(1967) (1967); S.C. Res.
233, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/233(1967) (1967).
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When the war concluded on June 10, 1967, Israel had removed Egypt
from the entire Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, Jordan from the West Bank and
East Jerusalem, and Syria from the Golan Heights. 2 7 Two days later, the
U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 237, which called upon Israel to
"ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations have taken place.' '

28

Having had neither an

interest in conducting a war nor a desire to expand territorially, 129 Israel
offered to return all acquired territories in exchange for full peace accords
with its Arab neighbors. 30 The proposal was rejected by Arab countries. 1 '
As a result, the 1967 Six-Day War was "the first war in history
which.., ended with the victors suing
for peace and the vanquished
13 2
calling for unconditional surrender.'

E. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
Immediately following the Six-Day War, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 242,133 which has been described as "[t]he most

127. Adam Roberts, ProlongedMilitary Occupation: The Israeli-OccupiedTerritoriesSince
1967, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 44,58-59 (1990). The territories Israel gained during the course of the war
were three times larger than its prewar borders. Shoham, supranote 123, at 248-49. Maps depicting
Israeli territorial acquisitions are contained in GILBERT, supra note 76, at 645-49.
128. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1361stmtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/237(1967) (1967).
The Resolution did not call for a return of territories. See id.
129. Israel's primary military objective during the war was "the removal of the threat to the
State of Israel." DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 5 (2002); see also NISAN, supra note 113, at 5 ("[N]ationalism
was not a force for expansion in 1967. Israel... sought Arab recognition, not of her power, but of
her existence.").
130. Shoham, supranote 123, at 249. Israel refused, however, to relinquish East Jerusalem to
Jordan. d.
131. Id.; see BARRY RUBIN,REVOLUTION UNTIL VICTORY?: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
THE PLO 13 (1994). The Arab League remained "unite[d] ...
to ensure the withdrawal of... Israeli
forces from the Arab lands which ha[d] been occupied .... This w[ould] be done within the
framework of... no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, [and] no negotiations with it ....
"
Arab League Summit Conference Resolution (Sept. 1, 1967), in I PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra
note 15, at 209, 209.
132. ABBA EBAN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 446 (1977).
133. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242(1967)
(1967). Resolution 242 required
(i)
(ii)

Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent
conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force ....
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'
significant international pronouncement on the Arab-Israeli dispute."134
Although the Resolution essentially provided for Arab state recognition of
Israel's legitimacy and secured borders in exchange'35 for Israel's
withdrawal from territories acquired'36 during the 1967 war, 3 7 it was
nonetheless a "masterpiece of deliberate... ambiguity."'3 The Resolution
referred to neither Israel' 39 nor the Palestinians 4 ° by name. Additionally,
the Resolution's deliberate omission' 4 ' of the word "the"' 142 from the
English translation'43 of the phrase "from territories occupied in the recent

Id.
134. SHLAIM, supranote 92, at 259-60. Israeli Diplomat Abba Eban noted that Resolution 242
became the "documentary basis for a peace treaty with Egypt, a peace treaty with Jordan, and a
negotiation with Syria." ABBA EBAN, DIPLOMACY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 141 (1998).
135. See AMNON SELLA& YAEL YISHAI, ISRAEL THE PEACEFUL BELLIGERENT 1967-79, at 9
(1986) (stating that Israel's victory during the 1967 war "gave Israel a bargaining position").
Resolution 242 served as the original source ofthe "formula 'land for peace."' GILBERT, supra note
76, at 398-99.
136. In an effort to remain impartial, this Note uses the term "acquired" instead of "occupied"
to describe the territories. Whether the territories are "occupied" remains disputed. See infra Part
V.A.
137. See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 133; HEMDA BEN-YEHUDA & SHMUEL SANDLER, THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT TRANSFORMED 108 (2002).

138. SHLAIM, supra note 92, at 260; see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
139. See S.C. Res. 242, supranote 133. The Resolution referred only to "Israel armed forces."
Id.The Resolution's failure to include Israel by name "was distressing to many Israelis, who shared
[First Israeli Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion's long-held suspicion ... of any agreement which
did not mention 'Israel' by name." GILBERT, supra note 76, at 399.
140. See S.C. Res. 242, supranote 133. Resolution 242 refers to the Palestinians as refugees
whose status would be resolved through "a just settlement of the refugee problem." Id. Resolution
242 was "a solution for a humanitarian problem, but the Arab countries and the Palestinians
themselves were seeking political solutions for the Palestinian people." SELLA & YISHAI, supranote
135, at 12; see infra note 146 and accompanying text. Resolution 242 does not require that
Palestinians be granted any territory or political recognition. BARD, supra note 102, at 68-69.
141. The omission was intentional: "'[T]here is reference ... both to withdrawal from
territories and to secure and recognized boundaries ....

[T]hese two things should be read

concurrently and ... the omission of the word 'all' before the word 'territories' is deliberate."' 1
PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 211 (quoting Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs). Efforts to revise the language of Resolution 242 failed: "It
is . . . not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the
territories." Id. (quoting Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University,
U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs).
142. The Soviet delegate sought to include the phrase "all the" in reference to the territories
from which Israel's armed forces would be required to withdraw. BARD, supra note 102, at 67.
143. The word had been intentionally excluded from the English version but appeared in the
official French translation. GILBERT, supra note 76, at 399. Despite the discrepancy between the
two versions, "the purposes are perfectly clear." 1 PALESTINE: DOCUMENTS, supranote 15, at 21011 (quoting Lord Caradon, sponsor of the draft of Resolution 242 that was adopted).
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conflict"'" has been the focus of much debate'45 and conflicting
interpretations of the status of territories Israel acquired during the war. 146
to provide for a
Supporters of the Resolution believed that it "seem[ed]
147
satisfactory solution of the Middle East controversy.'
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to produce significant
numbers of casualties. During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel engaged in a
war of attrition with Egypt, a fourth regional armed conflict with its Arab
neighbors in 1973, and a protracted campaign against the PLO in Southern
Lebanon that spanned nearly twenty years. 148 Resolution 242, viewed as
49
a paradigm of the U.N.'s treatment of the Middle East conflict,'

144. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 133.
145. The Resolution has several inconsistencies:
The preamble ...emphasises... 'inadmissiblity of the acquisition of territory by
war', while section i(i) speaks of 'withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict'.... If acquisition of territory by war
was inadmissible, then Israel should have been instructed to withdraw from all the
occupied territories ....
SELLA & YISHAI, supra note 135, at 12. Sella and Yishai added:

If, however, the spirit of the document was.., that Israel must withdraw from all
the occupied territories, why were these territories not named and/or indicated on
accompanying maps? Then again if the intention was that there should be a total
withdrawal, why were only the armed forces referred to?
Id.
146. Israel interpreted Resolution 242 as not requiring complete withdrawal from the acquired
territories. BEN-YEHUDA & SANDLER, supra note 137, at 108; see BARD, supra note 102, at 67

(quoting Lord Caradon: "It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of
June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial."). Furthermore, Israel refused
to withdraw from any territories until direct negotiations facilitated a "contractual peace agreement
that incorporated secure and recognized boundaries." SHLAIM, supra note 92, at 260.
Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors held a different interpretation. Id. Arab acceptance of
Resolution 242 has hinged upon an interpretation that Israel withdraw totally and unconditionally
from the acquired territories. Id. The PLO immediately rejected it because it was "superficial ....
The resolution more than once refers to Israel's right to exist." Statement Issued by the Palestine
Liberation Organization Rejecting U.N. Resolution 242 (Nov. 23, 1967), in 1 PALESTINE:
DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 212, 212. The statement concluded that the PLO rejected the
resolution both "as a whole and in detail. In so doing it is ...declaring the determination of the
Palestinian people to continue their revolutionary struggle to liberate their homeland." Id.
147. Quincy Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 270, 270 (1970). But see
CATTAN, supra note 80, at 208 ("Resolution 242 falls short of providing.., for ajust and lasting
peace.").
148. See GILBERT, supra note 76, at 426-524; SHAIM, supra note 92, at 289-351, 384-423;
TESSLER, supra note 76, at 474-77, 568-77.

149. The Resolution has been described as completely "misrepresented." DISPUTED
BANK AND GAZA STRIP 14-16 (2003)

TERRITORIES: FORGOTTEN FACTS ABOUT THE WEST
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demonstrates a pattern of U.N. involvement that exacerbated, rather than
resolved, the contentious Israeli-Palestinian dynamic.'
IV. ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS

"The danger of the Middle East situation imposes a positive
responsibility upon the United Nations .... ,,51 Despite the U.N.'s efforts
to achieve peace in the region, its treatment of Israel has been far from
objective and impartial. Israel has been described as "the United Nations'
favourite punching bag." '52 The contentious relationship between the U.N.
and Israel began prior to Israel's admission to the organization and was
evident in the General Assembly's treatment of Israel's membership
application.153 Several member nations, in an effort that was
"unprecedented in the history of admissions to the United Nations,"
launched a successful campaign to reject Israel's initial application.154 The
General Assembly admitted Israel to the U.N. only upon re-application the
following year. 155

Although the sovereign equality of states is a fundamental principle of
the U.N.,"Israel has suffered a state of inequality" at the U.N.t 56 In 1999,
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that the U.N. has been
regarded as biased against Israel.157 The General Assembly has
consistently pursued an anti-Israeli agenda that "can only be called an

[hereinafter DISPUTED TERRITORIES].
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. Wright, supra note 147, at 273.
152. The UN's Blinkers, supra note 67; see also Michael J. Jordan, UN's 'Two Standards'
Under Fire: Critics Ask Why Some Nations Are Held to UN Resolutions and Others Are Not,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2002, at 1 (noting that "the UN has painted the Jewish State
as the world's great pariah"). The U.N. "'is the tool of those who would make Israel the archetypal
human rights violator .... [Ilt is a breeding ground for anti-Semitism."' Morris B. Abram, AntiSemitism in the UnitedNations (1998) (quoting Professor Anne Bayefsky of York University), at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unantisem.html (last visited May 9, 2005).
153. The General Assembly conducted a "severe investigation" during which the Israeli
representative "was subjected to a searching cross-examination concerning his government's views
on a number of outstanding topics." NAT'L STUDIES ON INT'L ORG., supra note 89, at 58.
154. Id.Israel's initial request for admission was denied. Id. at 59. But see supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
155. G.A. Res. 273, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 207th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/273(III)
(1949).
156. The Treatmentoflsraelby the UnitedNations: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Int l
Relations, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) [hereinafter Treatment of IsraelHearing] (statement ofRep. RosLehtinen).
157. Arnold Beichman, U.N.Bias AgainstIsrael,WASH. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at B3 (quoting
Secretary-General Annan: "[T]he United Nations is regarded by many as biased against the state
of Israel. I know that Israelis see hypocrisy and double standards in the intense scrutiny given to
some of its actions, while other situations fail to elicit the world's outrage.").
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obsession with the State of Israel" since Israel joined the U.N. 58 Attempts
by the General Assembly to internationalize Jerusalem 59 nine months after
Israel's admission to the organization highlighted the beginning of Israel's
ongoing struggle to receive fair treatment within the organization. 6 °
A. Isolationof Israel Within the UnitedNations
Israel has been described as having received "second-class status"
within the U.N. 161Israel has consistently been excluded from receiving the
same benefits accorded to other nations, 62 whether in terms of financial
aid 16 or membership in a regional group. For a member nation to serve
within the U.N. Security Council or other U.N. committees, it first must
belong to a regional group."64 Although Israel geographically belongs in
the Asian Group, it has been barred from membership primarily by Arab
states. 65 As late as 1999, non-Arab states such as France have also
158. AM. JEWISH COMM., ONE-SIDED: THE RELENTLESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE

UNITED NATIONS, at i (2004); see also Treatment of Israel Hearing, supra note 156, at 10
(statement of the Honorable C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State). The General Assembly's treatment of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict "touches directly upon Israel's very right to existence." NAT'L STUDIES ON
INT'L ORG., supranote 89, at 60.
159. Despite Israel's protests against any U.N. action that wouldjeopardize Israeli sovereignty
over Jewish portions of Jerusalem, see NAT'L STUDIES ON INT'L ORG., supra note 89, at 133-34,
the General Assembly sought to internationalize Jerusalem as a corpus separatum.G.A. Res. 303,
U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., 275th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/303/(IV) (1949); see supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
160. One Israeli newspaper reported that "'Israel will not be able to play a positive role in the
family of nations if the [U.N.] ignores an issue vital to its existence."' NAT'L STUDIES ON INT'L
ORG., supra note 89, at 135 (quoting HA'ARETZ from Dec. 8, 1949).
The "family of nations" harnessed substantial support to condemn Israel throughout the past
five decades. The House International Relations Committee noted that "no nation has been the
subject of such.., unusual emergency special session[s] except the State of Israel." Treatment of
IsraelHearing,supranote 156, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Gilman); see also AM. JEWISH
COMM., supra note 158, at iii (noting that "no other country was subject to the relentless, indeed
obsessive, attention that was focused on Israel in the General Assembly and other UN bodies").
161. Developments in the Middle East: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
105th Cong. 23 (1998) (statement of Rep. Rothman).
162. See supra note 156-57 and accompanying text.
163. In 1974 the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) denied
Israel membership and barred it from receiving UNESCO aid. UNESCO Vote on IsraelScored,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1974, at 46.
164. See H.R. 3236, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1998) (recognizing that membership in a regional
bloc serves as the basis for rotating service on the Security Council).
165. BARD, supra note 102, at 118; Mauritania,IsraelForgeDiplomaticTies: African Nation
Becomes 3rd Arab Country with Full Relations with Jewish State, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 1999, at
12A. "Israel is the only longstanding member.., to be denied acceptance into any of the United
Nations regional blocs .... H.R. 3236, § 2(a)(1). Attempts to deprive Israel of its rights to fully
participate in the U.N. "have not enhanced Israeli respect for the Organization." Roberts, supranote
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expressed opposition to Israel's admission into a regional group. 166 In
1998, both Houses of Congress introduced bills urging equitable treatment
of Israel in the U.N.1 67 In 2000, Israel, as the only U.N. member not
belonging to a group, 68 gained temporary membership 169 to the Western
Europe and Others Group (WEOG). 17 °
B. Anti-Semitic and Anti-Israeli Sentiment Within
the United Nations
While providing an atmosphere in which member nations succeeded in
restricting Israel's full participation within the organization, the U.N. has
also served as a forum for "open and emphatic displays of antiSemitism."l'' Although the U.N. has condemned nearly all manifestations
of racism, it has continually ignored, and in some instances encouraged,
anti-Semitic expressions.'72 Syrian representatives invoked the "blood
libel"' 73 accusation against Jews during a session of the U.N. Commission

127, at 75.
166. See Treatment oflsrael Hearing,supra note 156, at 28 (statement of C. David Welch).
Most members of the European Union (EU) opposed admitting Israel into the Western Europe and
Others Group (WEOG) regional bloc. Id. at 10.
167. The House bill urged the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. to "take all steps necessary to
ensure Israel's acceptance" into the WEOG. H.R. 3236, § 2(a)(2). The Senate bill mirrored the
language of its House counterpart. See S. 2092, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
168. Israel's New UN Role, JERUSALEM POST, June 4, 2000, at 6; see Betsy Pisik, TelAviv
Comes out of Wilderness Joins Regional Bloc at U.N. of Western, Other Democracies, WASH.
TIMES, May 31, 2000, at A9.
169. The EU did not object to Israel's inclusion within the WEOG provided that membership
was conditioned on several terms. Nitzan Horowitz, Congress Threatensto Withhold UN Dues in
Support of Israel Joining European Group, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 16, 2000, available at
http://abbc2.com/historia/zionism/UNN_Congress isrl.html. Israel must re-apply for membership
to the WEOG every four years and continue to seek admission into the Asian Group, cannot
participate in WEOG activities outside the U.S., cannot seek election to the Security Council for
at least three years, and is prohibited from presenting candidates for various elected positions for
at least two years. BARD, supra note 102, at 119; Israel'sNew UN Role, supra note 168.
170. Despite its temporary member status, Israel's participation in the WEOG was a
"breakthrough in Israel's fifty-year exclusion from UN bodies," BARD, supra note 102, at 118, that
rectified "a long-standing, wholly inexcusable exclusion of one country, and one country only, from
any regional group in the United Nations." Pisik, supra note 168 (quoting American U.N.
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke).
171. Treatment of Israel Hearing, supra note 156, app. at 56 (prepared statement of The
Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman,
Committee on International Relations).
172. BARD, supra note 102, at 119. Resolution 623 mentioned the term "anti-Semitism" for
the first time in the organization's history. G.A. Res. 623, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item
108, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/53/623 (1998); BARD, supra note 102, at 119.
173. The ancient "blood libel" slander falsely accused Jews of using the blood of non-Jews
to bake matzoh (unleavened bread) during the Passover holiday. Letter from Yehuda Lancry,
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on Human Rights in 1991.174 The Commission accepted the PLO
representative's accusation that Israel deliberately infected several hundred
' In
Palestinian children with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 75
its infamous Resolution 3379,176 the General Assembly noted an "unholy"

alliance between South African apartheid and Zionism with its
determination that Zionism was "a form of racism and racial
discrimination.'

' 77

In

October

2000,

the

Deputy

Permanent

178
Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya likened the IDF to Nazis,

Permanent Representative ofIsrael, to the Secretary-General, United Nations (May 18,2001), U.N.
Doc. A/56/79, at 2. Only recently has the Commission on Human Rights acknowledged the "blood
libel" as one form of anti-Semitism. Racism, RacialDiscrimination,Xenophobia andAll Forms of
Discrimination,U.N. ESCOR, 60th Sess., Provisional Agenda Items 6, 9, 17, at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/NGO/5 (2004).
174. Treatment of Israel Hearing, supra note 156, at 2 (opening statement of Chairman
Gilman); David Littman, Syria's Blood Libel Revival at the UN 1991-2000, MIDSTREAM,
Feb./Mar. 2000, at 2, 3.
175. The Palestinian observer stated in 1997 that Israeli authorities intentionally injected
Palestinian children with the virus, spurning an "AIDS libel." David Littman, Press Release
HR/CN/819 18 March 1998, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980318.HRCN819.
html (last visited May 9, 2005). Israel has been the only nation subjected to such an accusation.
Beichman, supra note 157.
176. G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3379(XXX) (1975).
177. Id. The resolution noted that "the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist
regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa... [are] linked in their policy aimed at repression of the
dignity and integrity of the human being." Id. "The General Assembly's attitude to Israel has often
been strident and denunciatory." Roberts, supra note 127, at 75. Henry Cattan, however, praised
the resolution as merely an example wherein "the truth hurts." CATTAN, supranote 80, at 221.
Chaim Herzog, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N., admonished the General Assembly for adopting
Resolution 3379: "[It] is part of a dangerous anti-Semitic idiom which is being insinuated... to
block the current move towards.., peace in the Middle East." Chaim Herzog, Address Before the
U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 10, 1975), in I PALESTINE: DoCUMENTS, supranote 15, at 236,239.
Although Resolution 3379 was repealed in December 1991, see G.A. Res. 86, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., 74th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/86 (1991), the General Assembly passed four separate
anti-Israel resolutions that month. See G.A. Res. 82, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 73d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/46/82 (1991) (condemning Israel's "occupation" of Palestinian territory"); G.A. Res.
76, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/76 (199 1) (expressing "profound
shock" at Israel's response to the first Palestinian Intifada);G.A. Res. 75, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/75 (199 1) (inviting the PLO to participate in the Internatonal
Peace Conference on the Middle East); G.A. Res. 47, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 66th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/47 (1991) (condemning Israel's treatment of Palestinians, including its
"torture of children").
178. The representative denounced Israel for "usurping Palestine": "[W]e call upon the
[Security] Council ... to condemn the Nazi-like practices perpetuated daily by the Zionists in the
occupied territories, which have been perfected by those who call themselves the victims of a
holocaust at the hands of Nazi executioners and who now apply them perfectly against the
Palestinians." U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4204th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4204 (Resumption 2)
(2000) (statement of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). Characterizing Israel as "the Nazi Zionist regime"
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an accusation that re-emerged a year and a half later. 179
C. ImbalancedTreatment of the Israeli-PalestinianConflict
by the UnitedNations
The core principle of direct negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian
representatives was established during peace negotiations in 1991.80
Despite diplomatic statements that "it was ultimately up to the [Israelis and
Palestinians] to take the necessary steps to make the process succeed, ...'
the General Assembly engaged in a campaign to delegitimize Israel and
undermine the peace process by adopting one-sided resolutions and
committee reports.1 82 In 1998 alone, the General Assembly adopted
twenty-one separate resolutions criticizing or condemning Israel.' 83
Israel has been denounced for extreme violations of Palestinians'
human rights,18 4 and the Palestinian plight has been a central, if not
was a common rhetorical device employed by Arab countries. PETERS, supra note 76, at 175. In
1982, an Egyptian magazine stated that "'what Hitler did in 12 years cannot be compared to what
Israel has done in twelve days."' Id.at 175 & n. 10 (quoting Anis Mansour, What If the PLO Leaves
Lebanon?, OCTOBER, Aug. 8, 1982).

179. In April 2002, the Palestinian observer Nasser al-Kidwa reiterated that "[w]hat the Israeli
army was doing was no different from what the Nazi forces did in many European cities." Press
Release, Security Council, United Nations, Council Hears Renewed Calls for Implementation of
Its Resolutions, Dispatch of International Monitoring Force to Middle East (Apr. 9, 2002), U.N.
Doc. SC/7359.
180. AM. JEWISH COMM., supranote 158, at iv. But see Written Statement of the United States
of America, (Legal Consequences,supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at *8-15, *23-30, availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement19 UnitedStates
ofAmerica.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005); supra note 146 and accompanying text.
181. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, ECOSOC Adopts
Resolutions and Decisions on Regional Cooperation in Economic, Social and Related Fields (July
18, 2003), U.N. Doc. ECOSOC/6083, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/
ecosoc6083.doc.htm (last visited May 9, 2005).
182. AM. JEWISH COMM., supranote 158, at iv.

183. Treatment of Israel Hearing,supra note 156, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman
Gilman). Chairman Gilman noted that "these condemnations, couched in virulently anti-Israel
language, give legitimacy to those who still wish to spread hatred." Id. at 2. The General Assembly
has passed over 400 resolutions against Israel since 1964. Tom Feeney, Affirm Israel'sRight to
ProtectItself, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRm., Feb. 10, 2004, at A 1l.

184. As early as 1969, the method by which the General Assembly investigated alleged Israeli
human rights violations suggested the organization's attitude toward Israel: "A ...problem was
created by the makeup of the group appointed ... to investigate human rights in the Israelioccupied territories ....
None of [the] states maintained diplomatic relations with Israel." Thomas
M. Franck & H. Scott Fairley, ProceduralDue Process in Human Rights Fact-Findingby
InternationalAgencies, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308, 314 (1980). Although "an allegation of bias need
not be accepted at face value when made by an accused ... the credibility of the process would
have benefited from the selection of fact finders against whom no plausible charge could have been
made." Id. Resolution 124 ignored attacks against Israeli civilians and instead "[d]eplore[d] those
policies and practices of Israel that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people." G.A. Res.
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disproportionate, concern of the U.N."'5 Although the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees typically dispenses welfare and relief to
refugee groups, a separate organization, the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), "has been an anomaly in the
UN system, operating as the only UN organization devoted entirely to the
plight of one group of refugees."' 86 The General Assembly has never
explicitly endorsed Palestinian violence against Israel," 7 but it has
nevertheless reaffirmed its "support to the Palestinian people.., in [their]
struggle to regain [their] right to self-determination and independence."' 88
The Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People portrayed Israel as the sole source of the Palestinian
plight while simultaneously remaining silent on Palestinian terror.'89 Along
with the skewed presentation 9 ° of human and economic losses resulting
from the second Intifada, the General Assembly praised the Committee for
promoting Palestinian rights and supporting the Middle East peace
process. "'

124, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 73d plen. mtg., AIRES/57/124 U.N. Doc. (2002); see also ESTHER
ROSALIND COHEN, INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 7-27 (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 37, 1984) (discussing irregularities
and bias against Israel in U.N. committee reports).
185. The organization has been silent to the plight of Arabs, Muslims, and non-Palestinians
in other regions of the world. See AM. JEWISH COMM., supra note 158, at i. A former U.N.
Ambassador of Finland noted that "[m]ore meetings have been held.., more resolutions passed...
on Palestinian refugees than on any other single cause." Id.
186. Id. at iv.
187. The Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution affirming the "legitimate right
of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation by all available means in order to free its
land and be able to exercise its right of self-determination." Questions of the Violation of Human
Rights in the OccupiedArabTerritories,IncludingPalestine,U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
58th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/L.16 (2002). The Commission was
criticized for its "thinly veiled endorsement of Palestinian terror attacks" against Israel. Press
Release, The American Jewish Committee, Six European States Vote for Palestinian Terrorism
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Vote for Palestinian Terrorism], at http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/
PressReleases.asp?did=499 (last visited May 9, 2005).
188. G.A. Res. 43, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 90th plen. mtg., para. 23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/43
(1982). Resolution 43 affirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence.., by
all available means, including armed struggle." Id. at para. 2. The phrase "by all available means"
is "recognized UN code language for the legitimization of terrorism." Vote for Palestinian
Terrorism, supra note 187; see AM. JEWISH COMM., supra note 158, at iv.
189. See Report of the Committee on the Exerciseof the InalienableRights of the Palestinian
People, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 35, at 6, 8, U.N. Doc. A/57/35(SUPP) (2002). But see
supra Part II.A.
190. The United States has vetoed several resolutions based upon their failure to "condemn
Palestinian groups for enacting suicide bombings against Israelis." Edith M. Lederer, PA Slams UN
Resolution on Israeli Children,JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 12, 2003, at 6.
191. G.A. Res. 107, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 66th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/107
(2003). The Committee "carr[ies] out a public relations campaign on behalf of the Palestinians."
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During its fifty-eighth Session, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution entitled "Situation of and Assistance to Palestinian Children,"
which condemned Israeli conduct as psychologically destructive to
Palestinian youth.' 92 Although the resolution referenced "the safety and
well-being of all children in the whole Middle East region,"' 93 Israel
submitted a separate resolution.' 94 Calling upon the General Assembly to
similarly condemn Palestinian suicide bombings that killed Israeli
children,'95 Israel's resolution encountered significant opposition196 and
1 The resolution was eventually withdrawn.' 98
modification. 97
D. Setting Forth the Case Against Israel at the Hague
Israel's counterterrorism initiative garnered the attention of the U.N. in
2003 and was characterized as a "racist wall which devours Palestinian
territories."' 99 Approximately one and a half years after Israel began
construction of its security structure, 20 0 four nations20 ' within the Security
Council introduced a resolution condemning Israel.2 °2 The United States
vetoed its adoption.20 3 Following the defeat of the Security Council's draft

AM. JEWISH COMM., supra note 158, at 2. No counterpart U.N. organ exists to investigate and
expose terrorist atrocities against Israelis, and the U.N. "has never investigated the Palestinian
terror campaign against Israel." Feeney, supra note 183.
192. G.A. Res. 155, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 77th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/58/155
(2004).
193. Id.
194. Israeli representatives introduced a separate resolution because the General Assembly
resolution "pretends that one side.., has a monopoly on the status of victim." Herb Keinon, Israel
Sees Win in UNLoss, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 9,2003, at 2. The General Assembly resolution "was
overtly biased against Israel, completely ignoring the fate of scores of Israeli children wounded or
killed by Palestinian terrorists." David Goldberg, Edging TowardIrrelevancy: Canada's Vote at
the 57th UN General Assembly, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, Jan. 16, 2003, at 9.
195. See Sharon Feels the Heat, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Nov. 7, 2003, at 3.
196. Palestinians claimed that Israel's resolution was "an anti-Palestinian resolution." Lederer,
supranote 190 (quoting Palestinian observer Nasser Al-Kidwa). Israel believed that the resolution's
failure would clearly demonstrate the U.N.'s bias against Israel. Id.
197. Members sympathetic to the Palestinian cause submitted amendments to the Israeli
resolution that significantly altered its language and meaning. AM. JEWISH COMM., supra note 158,
at iii.
198. AM. JEWISH COMM., supra note 158, at iii.
199. G.A. Res. 1/30-PAL, 57th Sess., Annex 3, at 33, 35, U.N. Doc. A/57/824-S/2003/619
(2003).
200. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
201. Guinea, Pakistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Malaysia introduced the resolution.
Guinea, Malaysia,Pakistanand Syrian Arab Republic: DraftResolution,U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/980 (2003).
202. The proposed resolution stated that "the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
a wall in the Occupied Territories ...is illegal under relevant provisions of international law." Id.
203. The proposed resolution "was unbalanced and did not... address.., the devastating
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resolution, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution containing
language nearly identical to its predecessor. 2" The General Assembly
subsequently adopted a second resolution expressing its belief that Israel's
actions violated international law. 2 5 The resolution called upon the Hague
Court20 6 to issue an advisory opinion on the following legal question:
What are the legal consequences arising from the
construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying
Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the
Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions?2 °7
The United States20 8 reiterated its objection 20 9 and maintained that the
General Assembly "misstate[d] the applicable international law" and
suicide attacks that Israelis have had to endure." U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4842d mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.4842 (2003).
204. The General Assembly convened an emergency session and adopted a resolution that
"[d]emands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory... which is in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant
provisions of international law." G.A. Res. ES-10/13, U.N. GAOR., 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 22d
plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
205. See G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. GOAR, 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 23d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/ES-10/14 (2003).
206. The General Assembly invoked its authority in accordance with Article 96 of the U.N.
Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 96(1). The Hague Court, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, "may give an advisory opinion on any legal question." STATUTE OF
THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65(1).
207. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, supra note 205, at 3. The Hague Court "ha[d] never ruled on an
issue of this magnitude relative to state practice in this area." Tovah Lazaroff, Court Could
UndermineRules ofSelf-Defense, JERUSALEM POST, July 11, 2004, at 3. Given that Resolution ES10/14 represented the "first time ever" that the U.N. consulted the Hague Court on any matter
concerning the issue of Palestine suggests that the General Assembly sought to politicize the
conflict and exert additional pressure on Israel. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1083
(separate opinion of Judge Elaraby); see infranotes 208, 214-15,297 and accompanying text. The
General Assembly's previous reluctance to consult the Hague Court may stem from the fact that
"[t]he Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force." Interpretation
of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30).
208. The American delegate emphasized that the resolution was "one-sided and completely
unbalanced.... It doesn't even mention the word 'terrorism."' U.N. GOAR, 10th Emer. Spec.
Sess., 23d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/ES-i 0/PV.23 (2003); see also H.R. Con. Res. 390, 108th Cong.
(2004) (condemning the "inappropriate use" of the Hague Court "for narrow political purposes that
only do harm to the credibility of the General Assembly and the Court").
209. The Israeli delegate observed that "the countries that voted for [the resolution
are]... mostly tyrannical dictatorships." U.N. GOAR, 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 23d mtg. at 24, U.N.
Doc. A/ES-10/PV.23 (2003).
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cloaked a "political proceeding . . . in legal garb. 2 ° Immediately
following the Hague Court's acceptance of the case,211 controversy
engulfed the entire proceeding.
V. ISRAEL AND THE HAGUE COURT: A RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE
212
APPLICABLE LAWS TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The Hague Court's decision to issue an advisory opinion represented
"a hostile act.., against the Jewish state and not... a simple response to
' Israel, together with several nations, challenged the
a simple request." 213
court's jurisdictional authority to issue an advisory opinion 2 4 and
boycotted the proceedings.215 Israel further objected to the court's decision
that enabled Palestine to participate in the proceedings.2" 6 Additionally,

210. H.R. Con. Res. 371,108th Cong. (2004). Congress condemned the General Assembly's
"manipulation" of the Hague Court into a "political forum for denunciation of Israel and its
legitimate actions in self-defense." H.R. Con. Res. 390, 108th Cong. (2004). Hague Court Judge
Kooijmans wrote that "it would have been better if the Court had.., left issues.., to th[e] political
process." Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1071 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
211. Legal Consequences,supra note 63 (Order ofDec. 19,2003), availableathttp://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwporder/imwp iorder20031219.PDF (last visited May 9,2005).
212. "[T]he scale and intensity of Palestinian terrorist violence justify the application of
international laws of war." ALMOG, supra note 48, at xii.
213. Caroline B. Glick, Supreme Injustice, JERUSALEM POST, July 2, 2004, at 1. The court's
willingness to render an opinion rapidly represented "two sets of rules in international law ...one
set which is valid for the entire world and there is an international law applicable only to Israel."
Exclusive Interview with MeirRosenne (IsraCast.com broadcast, Jan. 17,2004) (transcript available
at http://www.isracast.com/Transcripts/Rosennetranscripts.htm (last visited May 9, 2005)).
214. Israel argued that "the advisory opinion request is ultra vires the competence of the 10th
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly." Written Statement of the Government of
Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety, (Legal Consequences, supranote 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at *4,
availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement_17
_Israel.pdf (last visited May 16, 2005); see also U.N. GOAR, 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 23d plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/ES- I O/PV.23 (2003) (discussing opposition to the advisory opinion by other
nations); supra note 208. In a separate opinion, Judge Buergenthal stated that "the Court should
have exercised its discretion and declined to render the requested advisory opinion." Legal
Consequences, supranote 63, at 1078 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal)
215. Herb Keinon & Tovah Lazaroff, ICJ Rules on Security Fence Today, JERUSALEM POST,
July 9, 2004, at 1. The United States and several European nations joined Israel by refusing to
participate in oral proceedings since the matter was "outside the ICJ's purview." Id.
216. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63 (Order of Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwporder/imwpiorder_20031219.pdf(last visited
May 16,2005). Israel maintained that "[t]he presence of'Palestine' before the Court signals clearly
the contentious nature of the proceedings." Written Statement of the Government of Israel on
Jurisdiction and Propriety, (Legal Consequences,supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at * 13, available
athttp://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement 17_Israel.pdf
(last visited May 16, 2005). Palestinian participation "reinforce[d] Israel's wider concerns about
the fairness of the process ... and the Order itself is already being viewed as an additional
substantive factor in the political debate about Palestinian statehood."Id at 14. The court, however,
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Israel questioned the court's ability to render an objective and impartial
opinion by arguing that its statute21 7 required that Judge Nabil Elarby
recuse himself from the case.21 8 The court rejected each of Israel's
positions. 219
A. Occupation Versus Administration: Conflicting
Interpretations
22
of the Fourth Hague Convention

1

The legal question submitted to the Hague Court by the General
Assembly221 presupposed that, based upon the Fourth Hague Convention
' the territories it acquired during the 1967
of 1907,222 Israel "occupied"223
permitted Palestine's participation because the U.N. accorded it a "special status of observer"
within the General Assembly and it cosponsored the draft resolution requesting the advisory
opinion. Legal Consequences, supranote 63 (Order of Dec. 19,2003), availableat http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwporder/imwpiorder 20031219.pdf(last visited May 16,2005).
217. Article 17(2) states, "No member may participate in the decision of any case in which
he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member
of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity."
STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 17(2).

218. Israel maintained that Judge Elaraby's prior service as an Egyptian diplomat
"demonstrated that he was actively engaged in opposition to Israel... on matters directly related
to the advisory opinion." ICJAdvisory Opinion on IsraeliSecurity Fence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 361,
362 (2004). The court denied Israel's motion to preclude Judge Elaraby from the proceedings
because the judge "'expressed no opinion on the question put in the present case,' and... 'could
not be regarded as having "previously taken part" in the case."' Id. (quoting Legal Consequences,
supra note 63 (Order of Dec. 19, 2003)).
Judge Buergenthal criticized the court's "most formalistic and narrow" reading of Article 17(2)
and reminded the majority that the provision "refers to what would generally be considered to be
the most egregious violations of judicial ethics." Legal Consequences, supra note 63 (dissenting
opinion, Order of Jan. 30, 2004), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp
order/imwp iorder_20040130_DissOpinionJudgeBuergenthal.pdf(last visited May 16,2005). The
statutory provision "reflect[ed] much broader conceptions of justice and fairness that must be
observed by courts of law," since "[j]udicial ethics are not matters strictly of hard and fast rules."
Id. Judge Buergenthal ultimately concluded that Judge Elaraby's participation in the case "creates
an appearance of bias" that warranted his preclusion. Id.
219. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63 (Order of Jan. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwporder/imwpiorder_20040130.pdf(last visited
May 16, 2005).
220. Although the question submitted by the General Assembly to the Hague Court explicitly
referenced the Fourth Geneva Convention, see supranote 207 and accompanying text, the court
engaged in an assessment of the applicability of the Fourth Hague Convention. See infra notes 22531 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
222. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 42,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Fourth Hague Convention]. Article 42 states, "Territory
is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be
exercised." Id.
223. Dore Gold wrote that the term "'occupation' has allowed Palestinian spokesmen to
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Six-Day War.224 The court concluded, without analysis, that Israel had and
"has continued to have the status of occupying Power" over the
territories. 225 The Israeli Government rejected the term "occupied" 226 and
instead considered
the territories as either "disputed ' 227 or
"administered. '228 The use of and distinction between these terms
dramatically reshapes the legal nature of the conflict. 229 The court's
findings, however, concealed the inherent complexity 23" that calls into

obfuscate" the history of the 1967 Six-Day War, particularly since Israel fought a defensive war.
Dore Gold, From "Occupied Territories" to "Disputed Territories," JERUSALEM
LETTER/VIEWPOINT, Jan. 16,2002, athttp://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp470.htm (last visited May 9,2005);
see supra note 126 and accompanying text. But see Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1030
(describing the 1967 war as simply an "armed conflict" and ignoring Arab states' aggression
against Israel).
224. See supranote 127 and accompanying text. The term "Occupied Territories" has become
synonymous with Gaza and the West Bank. See Ina Friedman, A Quiet Life on the Heights,
JERUSALEM REP., Oct. 4, 2004, at 18. Israel's presence in these territories "has attracted a vast
amount of international attention." Roberts, supranote 127, at 74. Although the Israeli Government
objects to the use of this term, see infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text, Israeli courts have
considered Gaza and the West Bank "occupied territory under the international law of belligerent
occupation." Bisharat, supranote 76, at 527; see KRETZMER, supra note 129, at 1.
225. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1031. The court based its conclusion primarily
upon the language of Article 42 of the Hague Convention. Id. The court also cited Resolution 242
because it explicitly contained the term "belligerency." Id. at 1030; see supra note 133 and
accompanying text. The repeated use of the term "occupied" throughout its opinion suggests that
the court ascribed to the General Assembly's language an "unrebutted presumption of accuracy"
and"neglected its primary duty [to] prob[e] disputed issues." Andrew C. McCarthy, The Endofthe
Right of Self-Defense? Israel,the WorldCourt, andthe War on Terror,COMMENTARY, Nov. 2004,
at 17, 20.
226. Israel has struggled to determine its role within the territories it acquired at the conclusion
of the 1967 Six-Day War. See GILBERT, supra note 76, at 396.
227. DISPUTED TERRITORIES, supra note 149, at 5.
228. The Israeli Government "had always preferred to refer to the Territories as
'administered,' rather than occupied." KRETZMER, supra note 129, at 33; see HANS P. RIDDER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 42 (1968) ("[I]t is usually the occupier who
determines whether belligerent occupation exists.").
229. One scholar noted that "the legal nature of the territories at issue, specifically the
sovereign rights over those territories, is fundamental to determining" whether laws of belligerent
occupation apply to Israel's administration of the territories. Ball, supra note 93, at 1016; see infra
notes 230-41.
230. Israel's Government "has not taken a ... clear stand on [the] applicability of the Hague
[Convention]." KRETZMER, supranote 129, at 35. Although scholars assert that the Convention "is
widely accepted," Roberts, supra note 127, at 63, the Israeli Government's position on
"occupation" suggests that the Fourth Hague Convention is inoperative over the territories. See
supranotes 226-28 and accompanying text. Butsee Allison, supra note 63, at 407 ("Israel does not
dispute the applicability of the Hague Regulations to the administration of the.., territories.").
The Israeli Government voluntarily engaged in "all the measures . . . [necessary]
to... ensure.. . public order and safety" in the territories immediately after the 1967 war. See
Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 222, at art. 43; infra note 240. Thus, Israel has balanced
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question whether Israel is an occupying power under, and is therefore
bound by, the Hague Convention.23 '
The laws of belligerent occupation 2.. operate only when two conditions
are satisfied: (1) territory is "actually placed under the authority" of an
army; and (2) that army is "hostile." -2 Although Israel established a
military government to administer the territories following the 1967 war, 34
Israel questioned whether it was a "hostile" army that entered former
Palestine Mandate territories to which Jordan and Egypt did not have legal
title between 1948 and 1967.235 The Israeli Government has adopted the

contradictory positions by voluntarily applying the Convention while simultaneously rejecting the
principle of belligerent occupation. See DISPUTED TERRITORIES, supra note 149, at 5 ("[The West
Bank and Gaza... should not be considered occupied territories."); Falk & Weston, supranote 25,
at 137 (stating that Israel has "announced its intention to adhere voluntarily to humanitarian legal
standards" contained within the Hague Convention). The court never explained the duality of
Israel's position and instead stated that the Hague Convention was "part of customary
law . . . recognized by all the participants in the proceedings before the Court." Legal
Consequences, supranote 63, at 1035. But see Written Statement of the Government of Israel on
Jurisdiction and Propriety, 43 I.L.M. 1009, (Legal Consequences,supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwstatements/iWrittenStatement17
Israel.pdf (last visited May 16, 2005) (containing no reference to the Israeli Government's
recognition of the Hague Convention's application in the proceeding before the court).
231. Unlike the Israeli Government's position, see supra note 230, the Israeli Supreme Court
has recognized the applicability of the Hague Convention, see H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill.
Council v. Gov't oflsrael, at * 13-14, availableat http:62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/fraesetSrch.html.
Thus, the "applicability of the Hague Regulations ...as customary international law in Israeli
Courts have gained judicial recognition." KRETZMER, supra note 129, at 40 (emphasis added).
232. "[T]he character of belligerent occupation always has been somewhat problematic. It has
been complicated in the present instance by the confused and overlapping claims to sovereign
identity that have attached... prior to and since the 1967 Six Day War." Richard A. Falk & Burns
H. Weston, The Relevance of InternationalLaw to Israeliand PalestinianRights in the West Bank
and Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 125, 133
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992). "There [exists] no single authoritative exegesis of the various purposes
the 'law on occupations."' Roberts, supranote
served by that part of the laws of war relating to ...
127, at 45. For a general history of the development of the laws of belligerent occupation, see
DORIS APPEL GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 1863-1914,
at 13-69 (1949).
233. Fourth Hague Convention, supranote 222, at art. 42; see RiDDER, supranote 228, at 37.
234. Because "there is no recognized 'state' government exerting sovereignty over a territory,
Israel's questioning the applicability of the law of belligerent occupancy may not be unfounded."
Ball, supra note 93, at 1001. An IDF proclamation issued immediately after the war stated that
Israel "assumed responsibility for security and maintenance of public order." Meir Shamgar, Legal
Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government-The Initial Stage, in 1 MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THETERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, at 13, 13 (Meir Shamgar
ed., 1982). Portions of the proclamation "based on the assumption that under international law any
territory outside the existing boundaries... would be regarded as occupied territory," were revoked
soon after the war. KRETZMER, supra note 129, at 32-33.
235. See supranote 115; infra notes 236-37, 254 and accompanying text. Israel contends that
"[o]ccupied territories are territories captured in war from an established and recognized
sovereign." DISPUTED TERRITORIES, supra note 149, at 5. Since neither the West Bank nor Gaza
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"Missing Reversioner" theory, which emphasizes that neither Egypt nor
Jordan were "legitimate sovereign[s]" over Gaza and the West Bank,236
respectively, thereby defeating any of their potential reversionary rights to
the territories. 237 Thus, Israel's government maintains that belligerent

were "under the legitimate and recognized sovereignty of any state prior to the Six Day War, they
should not be considered occupied territories." Id. Israel's rejection of occupation supports the
theory that defacto belligerent occupation is a legal fiction because an occupant "is under no legal
obligation to institute a Hague occupation." RIDDER, supra note 228, at 45-46. Therefore, the Israeli
Government adheres to a position that "'no single part of the Land of Israel is occupied or
conquered territory."' W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM:
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 273 (1986) (quoting Menachem Begin, Address the
Knesset (July 27, 1967)). But see H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Israel, at *2,
available at http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html ("Since 1967, Israel has been
holding the areas of Judea and Samaria ... in belligerent occupation."); supra note 231 and
accompanying text.
236. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria,3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 281-82 (1968). The "Missing Reversioner" theory, articulated by Dr.
Yehuda Z. Blum, was adopted by the Israeli Government. MALUSON & MALLISON, supra note 235,
at 253. Blum traced the legal title of Palestinian lands to the British Mandate and noted the Hague
Court previously recognized that "'[t]he doctrine of sovereignty has no application"' to the
Mandate system. Blum, supra,at 279 (quoting Int'l Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128,
150 (July 11) (separate opinion by Sir Arnold McNair)). Because "sovereignty over mandated
territories is located somewhere," the expiration of the British Mandate over Palestine did not leave
the territory "open to acquisition by the first comer" that would exercise force over it. Id. at 283;
see Eugene V. Rostow, "PalestinianSelf-Determination": PossibleFuturesfor the Unallocated
Territoriesof the PalestineMandate, 5 YALE STUD. WORLDPUB. ORD. 147, 158-59 (1979) (stating
that "the Palestine Mandate survived the termination of the Mandate administration as a trust"
under the U.N. Charter). Once Israel declared its sovereignty over Mandate territories allotted to
the Jewish state under the U.N. Partition Plan in 1948, see supra notes 108-09, 115-16 and
accompanying text, Gaza and the West Bank became "unallocated parts of the Mandate." Rostow,
supra,at 158.
During the 1948-49 war, Egypt and Jordan, in violation of U.N. Charter Article 2 by their "use
of force against the territorial integrity" of the remaining territories under the Palestine Mandate,
became belligerent occupiers of the West Bank and Gaza. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); Allison, supra
note 63, at 405 ("The international community refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Jordanian
and Egyptian occupations ....
Thus, no internationally recognized, legitimate authority occupied
the territories before Israel."); Blum, supra,at 280-84. Following the war, "[t]he illegality of the
presence of the various invading forces on the soil of former Mandatory Palestine was not
removed." Blum, supra, at 287. But see Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1067 (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans) ("[I]n my view... Jordan claimed sovereignty over the West
Bank."). Finding that Article 42 of the Convention was inoperative, Dr. Blum concluded that only
those portions of the law of occupation designed to protect humanitarian rights of the population
governed Israel's possession of the territories. Blum, supra, at 294; see also Roberts, supra note
127, at 65-66 (stating that Israel has willingly observed humanitarian provisions through a defacto
application but has "refus[ed] to accept the full de jure applicability"); supra note 230 and
accompanying text. But see Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1031 (basing its conclusion on
Article 42, not Article 43, of the Hague Convention).
237. By acquiring the territories from Egypt and Jordan, Israel "lawfully [assumed] control
of territory in respect of which no other States can show a better title." Blum, supra note 236, at
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occupation occurs only when the occupying power displaces the
"legitimate sovereign." Based upon these principles, Israel fervently
objected to the General Assembly's use of the term "occupied Palestinian
territories ' inthe legal question presented to the Hague Court.2 39
Regardless of whether the laws of belligerent occupation apply to the
conflict,24° they "are violated on a regular basis [by both sides] rendering
them inapplicable in fact, if not in law." 24 '
242

B. Applicability of the FourthGeneva Convention

Although Israel's arguments supporting the inapplicability of the
Fourth Hague Convention to the conflict may appear tenuous, Israel has
advanced a formidable objection to the dejure application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. 43 Israel's objection to application of the Convention
294. But see MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 235, at 254 ("Dr. Blum and the Government of
Israel use an obscure method of treaty interpretation which is not known in international law.");
Carol Bisharat, Palestineand HumanitarianLaw: IsraeliPracticein the West Bank and Gaza, 12
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 325, 339 (1989) (citing the Mallisons' study and rejecting
Blum's assessment because his theory "defies reality").
238. Use of the term "occupied territories" suggested that Israel had no legitimate claim to the
land. Gold, supra note 223 (noting that only Israel's territorial dispute has been labeled an
occupation); see Yossi Klein Halevi, The Real Dangerof the HagueRuling, JERUSALEM POST, July
23, 2004, at 23 (stating that the Hague Court found that Israel "ha[d] no legitimate claim to any
territory it won in 1967"). But see Gold, supra note 223 (noting that Resolution 242 implicitly
recognized Israel's right to retain part of the acquired territories); supraPart III.E.
239. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
240. The Hague Convention is defined only in the context of a hostile state.See Fourth Hague
Convention, supra note 222, at arts. 42-56. Under the missing reversioner theory, see supra notes
235-37, "[w]ithout a displaced sovereign power... the laws of belligerent occupation are reduced
to extending humanitarian provisions directly to individual persons," Ball, supra note 93, at 1001.
This interpretation supports Israel's de facto application of humanitarian provisions of the
Convention. See supra note 230. Because the "Palestinians lack full citizenship and a... sovereign
government," they are unable to be classified as "'affected citizens."' Ball, supranote 93, at 100102.
241. Ball, supra note 93 at 1002. The Hague Court and the U.N. focused primarily upon
Israel's obligations to respect civilians' rights without referencing reciprocal, implicit requirements
imposed upon the Palestinians under Article 43 to act in a manner that facilitates achieving those
ends. See supra note 230. Thus, "it could be argued that the actions of the [Palestinian] terrorist
groups ... amount to consistent material breaches of the inhabitants' duty of obedience." Ball,
supra note 93, at 1002; see also GRABER, supra note 232, at 70-109 (discussing the relationship
between the people who fall under the control of an occupying power and the occupying power and
whether occupied populations owe a duty to the occupant). But see Beres, supra note 10, at 243
(stating that the Palestinian Authority, a nonstate party to various peace accords, "cannot be held
jurisprudentially to the same standards of accountability as the State of Israel").
242. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. The Fourth Geneva
Convention "had so far been applied sparsely, if at all ... since 1949." Shamgar, supra note 234,
at 37.
243. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1035-36; infra note 248 and accompanying
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relies upon a "highly formalistic semantic" interpretation 2" of the treaty's
language in Article 2.245 Despite evidence that strongly suggests that the
Convention does not apply to Israel's administration of the territories,246
the Hague Court determined otherwise 247 and concluded that the
Convention rendered Israel's construction of its security structure
illegal.248

text.
244. A semantic formalistic approach "seeks to discover the meaning of a provision
exclusively by examining its wording, ignoring its background and drafting history." KRETZMER,
supra note 129, at 55. An "antiformalistic" approach "ignores the clear wording of the text and
seeks its meaning in the assumed evil its authors sought to prevent." Id. Either interpretation
suggests that the Convention does not apply to Israel's acquired territories. See infraParts V.B. 1-2.
245. Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, in relevant part:
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with
no armed resistance.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 242, at art. 2. Israel "distinguish[es] apriori between the
formal legal conclusions arising from its approach and the actual observance of the humanitarian
provisions of the Convention." Shangar, supra note 234, at 32.
246. Allison, supra note 63, at 404-05; see infra Parts V.B.1-2.
247. The court quoted an Israeli order issued shortly after the 1967 war suggesting Israel's
adoption of the Geneva Convention. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1035-36. The court
ignored the fact that Israel immediately repealed the provision and replaced it "with another
provision that had absolutely nothing to do with the Geneva Convention." KRETZMER, supra note
129, at 32-33; see supra note 234.
248. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1054. Although the Hague Court referenced the
Convention's travaux pr~paratoiresand statements by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to support its conclusion, it relied substantially upon the General Assembly's
conclusion that the Geneva Convention applied to the territories based upon Resolutions 60 and 97
and Security Council Resolutions 271, 446, 681, 799, and 904. Id. at 1036-37. Israel, however,
"officially denies that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de jure" to the territories and
maintains that it applies the Convention on a de facto basis for humanitarian purposes. Imseis,
supra note 119, at 68 & n.23; see also KRETZMER, supranote 129, at 33. Unlike its departure from
the Government over applicability of the Hague Conventions, see supra note 231, the Israeli
Supreme Court has refused to consider the Geneva Convention as part of customary international
law, thereby rendering it unavailable for consideration by the Israeli judiciary. H.C. 785/87, Abd
Al Nasser Al Aziz v. Commander of IDF Forces, 42(2) P.D. 1, at *37, 42-43, available at
http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); see also Ball, supra
note 93, at 1016 ("[A]pplying the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention is not a legal
question, but an empirical one outside the scope of Convention applicability in the first instance.").
But see Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventionsas Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 348,34950 (1987) (arguing that most nations have accepted the Geneva Conventions, thereby "invoking a
certain norm" that makes it part of customary rather than conventional international law).
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1. The Formalistic Approach
The "crux of the applicability debate rests, appropriately," with Article
2 of the Convention.249 Article 2 applies when two conditions are satisfied:
an armed conflict must exist, and such armed conflict must be waged
between two or more "High Contracting Parties."25 Both Israel and Jordan
ratified the Convention in 195 1.251 The language and structure of Article
2 has created considerable controversy 2 2 that resembles the debate over
language contained in Resolution 242.253 Israel maintained that the plain
language of the second paragraph of Article 2 suggests that the Convention
falling under the sovereignty of a High
applies only to "territories
254
Contracting Party.,

249. Ball, supra note 93, at 1008.
250. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1035-36. If both conditions are satisfied, "the
Convention applies ... in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the
contracting parties." Id. at 1036.
251. Id. at 1035. Some commentators suggest that Israel is bound by the Convention "via its
relationship with Jordan." Ball, supra note 93, at 1012; see Bisharat, supranote 237, at 339.
252. Ambiguity centers upon "whether the first and second paragraphs of Article 2
are... complementary or disjunctive," or whether "there is no linkage between the two paragraphs
and each has to be read and interpreted separately and independently, the first paragraph dealing
with armed conflicts, except military occupation, and only the second paragraph referring to the
occupation of territory." Shamgar, supra note 234, at 38; see supra note 245 and accompanying
text.
253. See supra Part III.E.
254. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1036. Israel objects to de jure application of the
Convention as it would grant Egypt and Jordan "the standing of an ousted sovereign whose
reversionary rights have to be respected and safeguarded." Shamgar, supranote 234, at 37. Because
"' [s]overeignty over a Mandated Territory is in abeyance... [and] will revive and vest in the new
State,"' neither Egypt nor Jordan acquired legal title to the territories. Blum, supranote 236, at 283
(quoting Int'l Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 150 (July 11) (separate opinion by Sir
Arnold McNair)) (first alteration in original). Therefore, Israel's presence in the territories cannot
be described as a partial or complete occupation of "territory of a High Contracting Party" under
the language of Article 2. See Caroline B. Glick, Our Self-Inflicted Wounds, JERUSALEM POST, Aug.
27, 2004, at 24 (quoting a statement by former U.N. Ambassador Dore Gold that the "Fourth
Geneva Convention is not applicable in the West Bank and Gaza because previous
occupants Jordan and Egypt entered those territories illegally in 1948"); see supra notes 236-37,
245, 248 and accompanying text.
Israel's interpretation prescribes independent and separate meaning to the two paragraphs,
which effects
the one and only conclusion . . . that the Convention applies merely to the
occupation of the territory of a High ContractingParty and not generally to
territories held under military occupation.... [A]s aprimafaciecorollary,.. .not
each and every occupation of territory turns it into territory to which the
Convention applies.
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Critics have maintained that Israel's interpretation ignores language
contained in the first paragraph of Article 2.55 The Hague Court
wholeheartedly adopted the position that paragraph two supplements
paragraph one256 despite contradictions in the Article's sentence structure.
The plain language of the two paragraphs substantiates Israel's
interpretation that each paragraph is "indeed258independent"257 and renders
the Convention inapplicable to the conflict.

Shamgar, supra note 234, at 38. But see Roberts, supra note 127, at 64 (describing Israel's
interpretation of Article 2 as "a technical error"). "In an effort to dispatch" the "missing
reversioner" theory, critics emphasize that the Convention never references that a High Contracting
Party be a "legitimate sovereign." Ball, supra note 93, at 1017-19, 1024. These critics, however,
rely solely upon the Pictet Commentary and fail to consider both the plain language of the
Convention and the drafters' reports. Id.at 1024-25; see infranotes 260-61 and accompanying text.
255. See MALLiSON & MALLISON, supra note 235, at 252-58; supra note 245. An alternative
interpretation suggests that "the Convention applies to every armed conflict . . . including
occupation." Shamgar, supra note 234, at 38. Critics of Israel stress that the "second paragraph is
irrelevant in cases of occupation arising from armed conflict, as these are covered by the first
paragraph." See, e.g., KRETZMER, supra note 129, at 34. Critics argue that the Fourth Geneva
Convention is "designed to protect the lives of civilians by requiring belligerents uniformly to yield
to humanitarian principles. Because Israel is considered a belligerent occupant of territory
possessed as a result of armed conflict with... Jordan [,the Convention applies." See, e.g., Ball,
supra note 93, at 1009 (footnote call number omitted). But see Shamgar, supra note 234, at 38
(stating that, even if this interpretation is valid, "this does not mean... that one can disregard the
wording of the second paragraph").
256. The court concluded that "the second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope
of application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph." Legal Consequences, supra
note 63, at 1036. The court based its interpretation on the travaux pr~paratoiresfrom the
Convention. Id.
Judge Buergenthal criticized "the Court's sweeping conclusion that the wall as a
whole ... violates international humanitarian law and international human rights law." Legal
Consequences, supra note 63, at 1078 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
257. Ball, supra note 93, at 1025-26. Drafters of the Convention noted that "the wording of
the paragraph is not very clear." Shamgar, supra note 234, at 39. The language of the Article
suggests that each paragraph was intended to be read independently. Ball, supra note 93, at 1025.
Meir Shamgar concluded that "the second paragraph ...refers only to the specific set of
circumstances.., which saw territories occupied without any preceding hostilities ....[U]se of
the word 'even' in the last clause of the second paragraph contradict[s] the argument that the
second paragraph adds.., only the specific situation mentioned in its last clause." Shamgar, supra
note 234, at 39. He added, "[T]he text adopted accords a more general meaning to the second
paragraph than the one connected with its final clause only." Id.David John Ball recognized that
the second paragraph of Article 2, which employs the term "even if," supports a general
interpretation: "[C]ommon sense use of 'even if,' as any lawyer is aware, indicates an alternative
to which the main proposition equally applies." Ball, supra note 93, at 1027-28.
258. Ball, supra note 93, at 1028. "Article 2(2) operates independently of Article
2(1) . . . . [T]he use of 'High Contracting Party' and 'the territory of a High Contracting
Party' . . . establish the state-centric focus of the Convention that renders it inapplicable to the sui
generis situation presented by the Middle East conflict." Id.
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2. The Antiformalistic Approach
Although the antiformalistic approach avoids consideration of the plain
language of the Convention's provisions,259 its application effects no
alternative conclusion. The Hague Court noted that its conclusion that the
Convention applied to the conflict was "confirmed by the Convention's
260
travaux priparatoires.,,
Reliance upon the positions advanced by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during the drafting of
the Convention and since 1967,261 however, is highly anachronistic 262 and
problematic.2 63 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 2 4 requires that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty. 2 65 Since the ordinary reading of Article 2 of the Convention
suggests that it is inapplicable to the conflict,2 66 the use of "supplementary

259. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. "[Flew scholars adhere to a plain reading of
the Fourth Geneva Convention." Ball, supranote 93, at 992. The Hague Court similarly relied upon
other sources of interpretation. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
260. Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at 1036. The court relied upon the commentary of
Jean Pictet, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) director and a "driving force
behind the creation of the Convention." Ball, supranote 93, at 992. The court noted that the ICRC's
interpretation "must be 'recognized and respected at all times."' Legal Consequences, supra note
63, at 1037 (quoting Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 242, at art. 142).
261. The ICRC has rejected Israel's position that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not
apply to the territories. Shamgar, supra note 234, at 32.
262. The position with which the Hague Court approached the legality of Israel's
counterterrorism initiative reflects a broader practice: "[C]ommentators analyze the... situation
from a pre-1967 historical perspective.... Pictet's study was 'based solely on practical experience
in the years before 1949' . . . and.., the 'proper perspective [was] lacking' since the Convention
had not been applied yet." Ball, supra note 93, at 992 (quoting OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL.,
COMMENTARY-IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CVILIAN PERSONS IN

THE TIME OF WAR 2, 9 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)) (alteration in original) (footnote call number

omitted).
263. As the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized, "the correct interpretation of a given
provision in the law stems not only... from the language.., but also from the purpose of the law."
H.C. 785/87, Abd Al Nasser Al Aziz v. Commander of IDF Forces, 42(2) P.D. 1, at *10, available
at http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (quoting C.A.
31/63, Feldberg v. Dir. for the Purposes of the Land Appreciation Tax Law, 17 P.D. 1231, 1235).
264. Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
265. Id. at art. 31 (emphasis added).
266. See supra Part V.B. 1.; see also Ball, supra note 93, at 1003 ("The inapplicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention... derives from an 'ordinary' reading of the Convention text taken
from its context, object, and purpose."); Erin L. Guruli, The Terrorism Era: Should the
International Community Redefine Its Legal Standards on Use of Force in Self-Defense?, 12
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 100, 108 ("[I]ntentions of the drafters cannot be granted
more importance than the actual text of the Article.").
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means of 26interpretation"
only confirm that the court's findings are
7
erroneous.

C. Conflicting Views of Palestine's Legal Status
The Hague Court recognized that the "existence of a 'Palestinian
people' [wa]s no longer in issue. 268 While the Palestinian people may not
be a legal fiction,269 Palestine itself "does not fit easily into defined
categories of international status. 2 7' The court accentuated this inherent

ambiguity by simultaneously constructing different classifications for
271
Palestine. The court accorded Palestine benefits resembling statehood
when it permitted the Palestinian delegation to submit a written statement
to the court without substantial justification. 2 By doing so, the court
ignored a significant corpus of legislation and statutory provisions
suggesting that Palestine did not qualify for participation in the
proceedings.273 Although it afforded Palestine full rights to participate in

267. Ball, supranote 93, at 1003.
268. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1041.
269. The court noted that President Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin's 1995 interim agreement
expressed Palestine's "legitimate rights." Id. at 1041-42; see supranotes 32-33 and accompanying
text. But see infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
270. Dajani, supra note 20, at 89-90. This ambiguity arises, in part, because Palestine is
recognized as a separate and distinct entity that simultaneously lacks sovereignty. Id.
271. "[A] fascinating debate over Palestine's existence as a subject of international law" began
after the PLO signed the 1993 Oslo Accords. Ball, supra note 93, at 1004-05. Nevertheless, "it is
an incontrovertible fact that the Occupied Palestinian Territory does not qualify as a sovereign
state." Id. at 1005.
272. See supranote 216 and accompanying text. Approximately sixty states have granted the
PLO "full diplomatic status." Math Noortmann, Non-State Actors in InternationalLaw, in NONSTATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59, 68 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001). Although the
General Assembly acknowledged the PLO's "legal status under international law," Palestine has
remained a non-State actor under international law. Dajani, supranote 20, at 89 ("In order for an
entity's statehood to be 'constituted' by recognition, it must first be recognized [as] a State....
[No State or international body has recognized [Palestine] as an independent State."); Noortmann,
supra, at 68; see also McCarthy, supra note 225, at 18 ("[The PLO's] metamorphosis into the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993 did not vest in the territories the legal standing of a sovereign.").
273. See Legal Consequences,supra note 63 (Order ofDec. 19,2003) ("[T]he United Nations
and its Member States are considered . . . to be able to furnish information."), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwporder/imwp iorder_20031219.pdf(last visited
Apr. 2, 2005). The PA "lacks the independence necessary to consolidate Palestine's legal status as
a State." Dajani, supra note 20, at 89. "Palestine," which superceded the PLO's designation in
1988, "should be used.., without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the [PLO]
within the United Nations system." G.A. Res. 177, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 82d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/43/177 (1988).
Resolution 250 never extended Palestine's rights to any proceeding involving the Hague Court.
See G.A. Res. 250, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 36, U.N. Doc. AIRES/52/250
(1998) (providing that Palestine would be seated in the U.N. "immediately after non-member States
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a manner similar to U.N. member states,2 74 the court nonetheless
recognized that Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis were not
"imputable to a foreign State. 2 75

D. Applicability ofArticle 51 of the United Nations Charter
The Hague Court's contradictory treatment of Palestine was poignantly
reflected in its determination that Israel could not invoke Article 5 1276 of
the U.N. Charter to justify its construction of the security structure.27 7 The
court stated that Article 51 "recognizes the existence of an inherent right
of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another
State. 27 8 Judge Kooijmans concluded that Israel could not invoke the U.N.
Charter's self-defense provision because Article 51 "is a rule of
international law and thus relates to international phenomena. "279 Although
the court referenced U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373,
both of which were adopted immediately after the September 11 terrorist

and before the other observers"). Such a designation of Palestine's seat after nonmember states
supports the conclusion that Palestine does not rise to the level of a state. See supranote 272 and
accompanying text. Moreover, "conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states
shall... be laid down by the Security Council." STATUTE OFTHE INT'LCOURT OF JUSTICE art. 35(2)
(emphasis added). No provisions substantiate the court's tenuous justification that enabled Palestine
to participate and derive the same benefits accorded to states in the proceedings.
274. STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 35(1) ("The Court shall be open to the
states parties to the present Statute."); supra note 216 and accompanying text. The court also
permitted the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "explicitly anti-Semitic
organizations," to present oral arguments. Glick, supra note 213. The court's decision to involve
these two groups was entirely discretionary and reflected "a clear indication of the court's lack of
objectivity towards the Jewish state." Id.; see STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34(2).
275. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1050.
276. Article 51 states, in pertinent part, that "[niothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. One scholar recognized that "since the founding of
the League of Nations, lawyers, statesmen and diplomats have been arguing the question of
defining 'aggression."' NATHAN FEINBERG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1979). For a
discussion of different interpretations of the term "armed attack," which appears only in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, see id. at 55-73.
277. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1049-50.
278. Id. at 1050. Such an interpretation supports the argument that Palestine is not a state. See
supra Part V.C.; see also Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1079 (declaration of Judge
Buergenthal) ("[T]he United Nations Charter ... does not make its exercise dependent upon an
armed attack by another State, leaving aside.., the question whether Palestine... should not be
and is not in fact being assimilated.., to a State.").
279. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1072 (separate opinion ofJudge Kooijmans). But
see infra notes 280, 282, 330-31.
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attacks,28 ° the court characterized Israel's security needs as "different from
that contemplated" by the Security Council Resolutions.28 '
Judge Buergenthal, however, declared that the court's interpretation
was a "legally dubious conclusion," 282 particularly because it never
examined the terrorism to which Israel responded with its construction of
the security structure.283 Judge Higgins similarly noted that Article 51
contained no express language suggesting that armed attacks must
originate from another state. 284 Regardless of the point of origin for acts of

280. Resolution 1368 recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence"
without reference to attacks perpetrated by state or nonstate actors. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR,
56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 368 (2001). Resolution 1373 emphasized the "need to
combat by all means .. .threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,"
regardless of state sponsorship. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001). Judge Kooijmans recognized but ultimately dismissed a significant
inconsistency in the court's reasoning: "The Security Council called acts of international terrorism,
without any further qualification, a threat to international peace and security... without ascribing
these acts of terrorism to a particular State. This is the completely new element in these
resolutions." Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1072 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
Jduge Kooijmans added, "This new element is not excluded by ...Article 51 since this conditions
the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this
armed attack must come from another State ....The Court has regrettably by-passed this new
element." Id. (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). But see infra note 282 and accompanying
text.
281. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1050. The court added that Israel's security threat
"originates within, and not outside, that territory." Id. Judge Kooijmans emphasized that the
Resolutions "refer to acts of internationalterrorism as constituting a threat to internationalpeace
and security; they therefore have no immediate bearing on terrorist acts originating within a
territory which is under control of the State which is also the victim of these acts." Id. at 1072
(separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). But see Falk & Weston, supra note 232, at 138 ("Until
recently... most of the violence directed against Israel has been planned and perpetrated... by
exiled liberation forces outside Israel-controlled territory.").
282. Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at 1079 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). Judge
Buergenthal noted that "[w]hether Israel's right of self-defence is in play.., depends.., on an
examination . . . of the deadly terrorist attacks" against Israel. Id. (declaration of Judge
Buergenthal). The court failed to consider "facts bearing on that issue" and could not adequately
determine the applicability of Article 51. Id.(declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
283. See Charles Krauthammer, Travesty at the Hague, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A21
("Israel finally finds a way to stop terrorism, and 14 eminences sitting in The Hague rule it
illegal.., in a 64-page opinion in which the word terrorism appears not once (except when citing
Israeli claims)."); Benjamin Netanyahu, Why IsraelNeeds a Fence, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at
A19 ("Palestinian terrorists have... murder[ed] 1,000 of our citizens. Despite this unprecedented
savagery, the court's 60-page opinion mentions terrorism only twice, and only in citations of
Israel's own position on the fence."); The UN's Blinkers, supra note 67 ("The
court['s] ... verdict.., was breathtakingly one-sided... [and] ignored the purpose for which the
barrier was built: to stop Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel.").
284. Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at 1063 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). Judge
Higgins stated, "I do not agree with all that the Court has to say on the question of the law of selfdefence." Id. (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). Judge Higgins noted, however, that the court's
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terrorism, 28 Judge Buergenthal reiterated that Israel maintained its right
to self-defense against any attack "provided the measures it takes are
otherwise consistent with the legitimate exercise of that right. 286
The court further rejected the argument that a "state of necessity"
justified Israel's construction of its security structure.2 87 Citing an earlier
decision in which it determined that necessity could only be invoked "on
an exceptional basis, ' 288 the court concluded that it was "not convinced"
that Israel considered alternative measures that would "safeguard the
interests of Israel against the peril., 289 Rather than assessing the relevant
facts that precipitated construction of Israel's counterterrorism initiative,290
the court relied exclusively on information provided by the U.N. 291' The
determination was derived from a 1986 opinion and not from any explicit language in Article 51.
Id.(separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
Justice Higgins also noted that the majority stated that the court "is indeed aware that the
question of the wall is part of a greater whole." Id. at 1060 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
Nonetheless, the court never addressed the "greater whole," and "the 'history' as recounted by the
Court ...[was] neither balanced nor satisfactory." Id. at 1060 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
But see id. at 1066 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) (stating that the court can "only examine
other issues to the extent that is necessary for the consideration of the question put to it").
285. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
286. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1080 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). Judge
Buergenthal added that "the Court fails to address any facts or evidence specifically rebutting
Israel's claim of military exigencies or requirements of national security." Id.(declaration of Judge
Buergenthal); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
287. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1050.
288. Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept.
25).
289. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1050. Judge Buergenthal, however, rejected the
court's assessment and emphasized that the court "says that it 'is not convinced' but it fails to
demonstrate why it is not convinced, and that is why these conclusions are not convincing." Id. at
1080 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (quoting supra note 63, at 1050).
290. See supra Parts II.A.2-3, B. 1.
291. Legal Consequences,supranote 63, at 1064-65 (separate opinion ofJudge Higgins). "The
Court has based itself largely on the... Written Statement of the United Nations. It is not clear
whether it has availed itself of other data ..."Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, "the Court barely
address[ed] the summaries of Israel's position.., which contradict or cast doubt on the material
the Court claims to rely on." Id. at 1080 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal); see Anne
Bayefsky, Had Enough?: The UN.Handicaps Israel, Along with the Rest of Us, NAT'L. REV.
ONLINE, July 17, 2004 ("Rather than... examin[ing] the facts for themselves, the Court relied
heavily on prior biased U.N. reporting."), at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bayefsky
200407171024.asp (last visited May 9, 2005).
Israel objected to the court's adoption of the term "wall" because it "reflect[edl a calculated
media campaign to raise pejorative connotations... of great concrete constructions of separation
such as the Berlin Wall." Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety, 43 I.L.M. 1009, (Legal Consequences, supra note 63) (Jan. 30, 2004), at *10- 11,
availableat www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwp statements/iwrittenstatement_17_Israel.
pdf(last visited Apr. 2,2005). Israel added that "[g]iven the intentionally pejorative use of the term
'wall', and the ready availability of the neutral term 'barrier' used in the Secretary-General's report,
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court's conclusion that Israel could not act in self-defense was "an
embarrassment for logic and common sense" and defied any sense of
rationality.292
VI.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE HAGUE COURT ADVISORY OPINION

The Hague Court concluded that Israel's construction of its
counterterrorism initiative in "Occupied Palestinian Territory" violated
international law.293 The court's advisory opinion was immediately
characterized as making "a mockery of Israel's right to defend itself."294
Following the release of the court's opinion, several senators introduced
a bill in the United States Senate condemning the court's findings.295 The
General Assembly reconvened an Emergency Session to adopt a resolution
demanding Israel's compliance with the decision.296 Israel has refused to

Israel ... objected to the Court's adoption of the term 'wall."' Id. at 11. Although the court
recognized conflicting terminology used to refer to the security structure, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text, it arbitrarily favored the General Assembly's use of "wall": "[T]he other
terms ... are no more accurate .... [T]he Court has therefore chosen to use the terminology
employed by the General Assembly." Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1029; see infra note
296 and accompanying text.
Israel provided little documentary support explaining the need for constructing its
counterterrorism measure. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1081 (declaration of Judge
Buergenthal). Nevertheless, Judge Buergenthal noted that "Israel had no legal obligation to
participate in these proceedings .... The Court may therefore not draw any adverse evidentiary
conclusions." Id.
292. Samuel Herman, The InternationalCourt of Injustice, J. NEWS (Westchester County,
N.Y.), July 27, 2004, at 4B.
293. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1054. The court required Israel to compensate
Palestinians for damage resulting from the security structure and called upon all states "not to
recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall." Id. at 1055. A PLO legal
advisor called the opinion a "milestone in the Palestinian struggle." Gregory Khalil, Just Say No
to Vetoes, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at A17.
294. Netanyahu, supra note 283. The court failed to consider any benefits the "fence"
bestowed upon either the Israelis or the Palestinians: "[T]he fence.., is a nonviolent defensive
measure .... [I]t has saved hundreds of lives.., and will benefit the Palestinian people by sparing
them the reprisals ... that come with the aftermath of a suicide bomb." Herman, supra note 292.
The decision, however, was not entirely surprising: "There is nothing new in the ICJ's anti-Israel
opinion that will ... change the hostile... environment in which Israel has been operating." Glick,
supra note 254.
295. S. Res. 408, 108th Cong. (2004). The bill acknowledged that "all countries possess an
inherent right to self-defense." Id. One Congressman who expressed outrage over the court's
decision to hear the case, see supra note 7, remarked that "the court simply did a cut and paste of
[the General Assembly's submission to the Court]... completely failing... [to mention] years of
brutal terrorism at the hands of Palestinian extremists." 150 CONG. REc. H5465 (daily ed. July 9,
2004) (statement of Rep. Pence).
296. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer. Spec. Sess., 27th plen mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/ES- 10/15 (2004).
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comply with the court's advisory opinion,29 7 but has implemented changes
to the structure based upon a recent ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court.298
Although the Hague Court's opinion focused specifically on the legality
of Israel's security structure, the implications of its ruling extend beyond
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly with respect to self-defense in
a post-September 11 world.
A. A Flexible Approach to InternationalHumanitarianLaw
The Hague Court employed a flexible application of the Fourth Hague
and Geneva Conventions to conclude that Israel was bound by both
conventions and precluded from erecting its security structure. 299 The
Hague Convention, codified during a period of relative peace in Europe,
contemplated a "classic case" of belligerent occupation.3"' The IsraeliPalestinian conflict, however, "has contained many special features" that
distinguish it from the classic situation contemplated by the Convention.30 '

297. The court recognized that its opinion "'has no binding force."' Legal Consequences,
supra note 63, at 1025 (quoting Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30)). Israel "already announced that it will ignore the Court's
decision." Jeremy Rabkin, 'Lawfare,' WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at A14; see David Warren,
Seeing the World Through an Airbrush, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 16, 2004, at A13 ("[T]he ICJ
decision would 'find its place in the garbage can of history."') (quoting a spokesperson from the
Israeli prime minister's office).
298. See supranote 63 and accompanying text. U.S. Congressional Representative Mike Pence
stated that "the Israeli Supreme Court['s]... rulings on the... [fence ha[ve] struck a fair balance
between the rights of Israelis to live free from suicide bombings and the right of Palestinians to
their economic well-being, and there is no legal basis for the court in the Hague to usurp its
authority." 150 CONG. REC. H5465 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pence). Israel joins
Morocco, France, Iceland, and the United States as nations rejecting the Hague Court's nonbinding
advisory opinions. See James S. Tisch, Who's Defying the World Court?, JEWISH WK., July 23,
2004, at http://www.thejewishweek.com/top/editletcontent.php3?artid=3570 (last visited May 9,
2005).
299. See Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at 1034-35, 1037-38. Although the conflict does
not fit within the parameters of a typical occupation, the court was guided by the notion that
"provisions of Hague and Geneva Law [were] still binding.., even though [a conflict] does not
meet the definition of armed conflict in those instruments." Steven R. Ratner, Revising the Geneva
Conventions to Regulate Force by and Against Terrorists:FourFallacies,1 ISR. DEF. FORCES L.
REv. 7, 9 (2003).
300. The Hague Convention represented "a late codification of a body of law adopted in an
atmosphere of nineteenth century liberalism... drafted for the conditions of a nineteenth century
world, so different... from the twentieth century and its total wars." GRABER, supra note 232, at
35. One scholar noted that belligerent occupation was "largely regulated" by the Fourth Hague
Convention. F. Llewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOC'Y 149, 160 (1924). But see supra Part V.A.
301. Roberts, supra note 127, at 61 (enumerating at least five elements rendering the conflict
unique).
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By finding that Israel violated the Hague Convention,302 the court
apparently believed that the Convention was "not considered outdated and
superseded by newer developments in international law."3 3 Humanitarian
law, the court implied, "has a sizeable 'place-holder"' for various types of
conflicts, regardless of the participation of state or nonstate actors. By
imposing upon Israel obligations under both the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, the court ensured that, regardless of Israel's voluntary
consideration of Palestinian humanitarian rights, "basic principles of
humanitarian law" applied to Israel dejure.a°5
B. New Precedentsfor a State 's InherentRight of Self-Defense
Unlike the flexible approach it utilized to apply international
humanitarian law to the conflict, the Hague Court's interpretation of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter represents a restrictive approach that
establishes dangerous precedent in an era of global terrorism. In order to
condemn Israel's construction of its security structure, the court engaged
in the "splitting of a legal hair"30 6 that defies legal reasoning, invalidates
a state's right to defend itself against terrorism, and enables terrorists to
manipulate and operate outside of the international legal system." 7 The
court's opinion established that "new rules" apply to and limit a state's
right of self-defense: (1) self-defense only applies to terrorist attacks that
reach a certain level of devastation and destruction; (2) the U.N. Charter
does not permit a state to engage in self-defense against an "armed attack"
by terrorists who are not state actors; and (3) self-defense does not include

302. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1046-47.
303. See GRABER, supra note 232, at 35; Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law
on Occupation:Resolution 1483 on Iraq in HistoricalPerspective,1 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 19,
23 (2003) ("The advent of the twentieth century... turned the duty imposed on the occupant into
a broad grant of authority to prescribe and create changes in the life of the occupied economy and
society.").
304. Ratner, supra note 299, at 8. This was not the position the court adopted regarding a
state's right of self-defense. See infra Part VI.B.
305. Ratner, supra note 299, at 9; see Legal Consequences,supranote 63, at 1035-38. But see
supra Part V.A.-B. The court's analysis focused solely upon the hardships imposed upon
Palestinians. See Editorial, A DisgracefulRuling, WASH. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at Al8. One critic
noted the court's hypocrisy: "[D]enial of Israel's right to defend itself because doing so might
violate 'humanitarian' rights was read in open court by the chiefjudge representing China, whose
government massacred hundreds of its own citizens ... "Krautharnmer, supra note 283.
306. Warren, supra note 297.
307. McCarthy, supranote 225, at 17. The court's advisory opinion "dealt a serious blow to
the credibility of international law" because it demonstrated "the way in which those who practice
terrorism have been allowed to manipulate the international legal system." Andrew Apostolou, A
Court in the Service of Terrorism: PlayingArafat's PropagandaGame, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/apostolou200407l90844.asp (last visited May 9,2005).
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nonviolent
Against the3"9backdrop of September 11, these
conclusions actions."'
are highly problematic.
1. Calculating the Gravity of an Attack
The Hague Court's declaration that Article 5 1"has no relevance" to the
case against Israel 310 suggests that it predicates a state's "inherent right"
to self-defense31' upon the gravity of the attack waged against it. 312 While
the court implicitly recognized the September 11 terrorist attacks against
the United States,3 13 it refused to acknowledge that Palestinian suicide
bombings against Israelis constituted terrorist acts. 314 In doing so, the court
endorses a subjective standard as to what acts of terror rise to the level of
an "armed attack., 315 The court had no difficultly concluding that the

308. Bayefsky, supra note 291.
309. Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at 1078 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); see also
id.at 1062-63 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (stating that "[i]t seems quite detached from
reality ... that it is the wall that presents a 'serious impediment"' to Israeli self-defense and
Palestinian self-determination).
310. Id. at 1050.
311. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
312. Requiring that "an attack reach a certain level of gravity before triggering a right of selfdefense would make the use of force more rather than less likely." William H. Taft, IV, SelfDefense and the Oil PlatformsDecision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 295, 300 (2004).
313. The court cited Resolutions 1368 and 1373 adopted after the September 11 attacks but
discussed neither their substance nor purpose. See LegalConsequences, supranote 63, at 1049-50.
314. The court merely stated that "Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts
of violence against its civilian population." Id.at 1050. Judge Koroma justified such attacks: "[I]t
is understandable that a prolonged occupation would engender resistance." Id.at 1057 (separate
opinion of Judge Koroma). Judge Elaraby added that "occupation has always been met with armed
resistance." Id. at 1088 (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby). Judge Owada went further by
describing the violence as "so-called terrorist attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers against the
Israeli civilian population." Id. at 1098 (separate opinion of Judge Owada). But see supra Part
II.A.2.-3.
315. The court implied that a certain "scale and effect" was required in order for an action to
constitute an "armed attack." Davis Brown, Use of ForceAgainst TerrorismAfter September 11 th:
State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 23
(2003); see Matthew Scott King, Note & Comment, The Legality of the United States War on
Terror:Is Article 51 a Legitimate Vehiclefor the War in Afghanistan orJust a Blanket to Cover-up
International War Crimes?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 457, 463 (2003) ("[Flactors such as the
terrorist threat to a state's safety... may be considered when trying to determine whether an attack
constitutes an 'armed attack."'). Thus, a single hostile act or a series of isolated attacks, such as a
suicide bombing, may or may not constitute an armed attack depending upon "' its magnitude or
severity."' Marco Sassoli, Use andAbuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 L. &
INEQUALITY 195, 202 (2004) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION
No.2, CRIMEs AND ELEMENTS FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION 3 (2003)). A terrorist attack
should be considered part of a larger scale of actions when determining whether such an attack rises
to the level of an "armed attack." See Kenneth Watkin, Controllingthe Use of Force: A Role for
Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (2004)
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September 11 attacks created a "situation [that] is... different" from the
violence in Israel.316 By distinguishing between acts of terrorism, the court
endorsed a highly subjective standard that trivialized loss of life and
arbitrarily placed a higher value upon those lives it deemed worthy of
protection.317 According separate standards of protection for Israelis and
Palestinians "will only serve to further stoke the long-running... conflict
'
and do nothing to bring it to an end."318
2. Imputing an "Armed Attack" to a State Actor
The court's limited interpretation of the language ofArticle 51 is based
solely upon the assumption that the drafters of the U.N. Charter did not
envision that an entity other than a state could engage in an armed
attack.319 Although the U.N. Charter did not define an "armed attack,"32
the court determined that Article 51 permits self-defense only in "the case
of armed attack by one State against another State."32 ' While this approach
may have rendered illegal Israel's security structure, it severely limits any
state's right to defend itself against attack.3 22 Thus, the court's conclusion

("[V]iolence inflicted by international terrorism can quickly reach the level of an armed attack as
contemplated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.").
316. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1050. This conclusion suggests that Palestinian
suicide bombings against Israelis constitute isolated instances of violence separate from a broader
atmosphere of terror, see supranote 314 and accompanying text, and ignores "an on-going pattern
of behavior involving terrorist activity" existing prior to September 11 and throughout the Second
Intifada. See King, supra note 315, at 463. The court, however, found no similarity between
September 11 and Palestinian suicide bombings. See Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 104950. But see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
317. The court's opinion suggested that Palestinian humanitarian concerns trumped Israel's
right to protect its citizens from terrorism: "[T]wo Israelis ...died in suicide attacks [with the
security structure], compared with 166 killed in the same time frame at the height of the terrorism.
But what are 164 dead Jews to this court?" Krauthammer, supra note 283.
318. Apostolou, supranote 307; see supra note 305 and accompanying text.
319. See Guruli, supra note 266, at 108. One scholar observed, "For the first time... states
are now forced to reevaluate the long-standing notion that only a state has the capacity to commit
an armed attack against another state .... Brown, supra note 315, at 24.
320. Brown, supra note 315, at 21. "[T]he court's opinion is almost entirely bereft of any
discussion of the actual practice ofstates ....A DisgracefulRuling, supranote 305; see also Amy
E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrineor Doctrinaire-TheFirstStrike DoctrineandPreemptive
Self-Defense UnderInternationalLaw,12 TUL. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 117, 137-39 (2004) (discussing
whether the U.N. Charter contemplated armed attacks by nonstate actors).
321. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1050. The court added that "Israel does not claim
that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State." Id.But see supra Part V.C.
322. See A DisgracefulRuling,supra note 305 ( "[T]he ICJ's worst folly was its assertion that
the inherent right of self-defense ...is not available to Israel... because it is not being attacked
by a sovereign state.... [T]his view [is]
not based on the language of the U.N. Charter" and "it
flies in the face of post-September 11 Security Council resolutions"). Thus, the court permits
Palestinian suicide bombings against Israelis based upon a narrow interpretation of the language
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suggests that the United States could not have invoked its right of selfdefense against al Qaeda absent specific authorization from the Security
Council.3 23 This interpretation suggests that a state must seek U.N.
authorization before engaging in an act of self-defense after a terrorist
attack.3 24 Ultimately, the court distinguished between the American and
Israeli attacks without elaboration3 25 and thereby applied a separate legal
standard for Israel's reliance upon self-defense.326
The court's limitation upon Israel's "inherent right ' 3 27 to self-defense
contemplated that Palestinian violence could not be imputed to a
Palestinian state.328 Since Palestinian violence "originates within, and not
outside" Israel,329 the court suggested that the location of a terrorist attack
determines whether a state can act in self-defense.33 ° Notwithstanding
of Article 51. See id.
323. The court suggests that, without Resolutions 1368 and 1373, the United States would
have no right to act in self-defense against al Qaeda. See Legal Consequences, supranote 63, at
1049-50; see also McCarthy, supra note 225, at 24 ("[Ilf the new rule is that terrorist attacks by
subnational actors are an insufficient predicate for... self-defense, then the U.S. has unlawfully
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq."). But see Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic
InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 879 (2003) (noting that the two resolutions
responded specifically to the terrorist attacks against the U.S. and "were not directed at the
membership as a whole"). Judge Kooijmans wrote that the court "rightly conclude[d] that the
[Israeli-Palestinian] situation is different from that contemplated by resolutions 1368 and 1373."
Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1072 (separate opinion of Judge Koojimans). But see
Alvarez, supra,at 879 ("Through [Resolutions 1368 and 1373] the Council went out of its way to
give its priorconsent to the invocation ofself-defense.") (emphasis added); McCarthy, supra note
225, at 24 ("At a time when.., terrorists scout high-profile targets," the court's interpretation "is
suicidal.").
324. This interpretation is in direct opposition to the language of Article 51 itself, which
explicitly authorizes a state to act in self-defense before it reports its actions to the U.N.:
"Nothing... shall impair the inherent right of... self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations .... Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
" U.N. CHARTER art. 51
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council ..
(emphasis added).
325. The court simply noted that the "situation is thus different." Legal Consequences,supra
note 63, at 1050; see supra note 322 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
327. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Use of the term "inherent" suggests its importance. See Mark B.
Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to AmendArticle 51 of the United
Nations Charter), 10 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 25, 31-32 (1987).
328. Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1050.
329. Id. Judge Higgins "fail[ed] to understand the Court's view that [Israel] loses the right to
defend [itselfl ... if the attacks emanate from the occupied territory." Id. at 1063 (separate opinion
of Judge Higgins).
330. See id. at 1050; see supra note 281 and accompanying text. This conclusion ignores the
circumstances of September 11 when nineteen foreign nationals boarded four American civilian
airliners at American airports. See Lippman, supra note 46, at 297; infra note 332. It also runs
contrary to the language of the Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1368. See S.C. Res. 1373,
supra note 280; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 280.
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international law principles that govern interactions between states, a
requirement that perpetrators of violence possess an "international
" '
personality" is not required.33
Proponents of America's exercise of force in self-defense after
September 11 have argued that a close association between the al Qaeda
network and Afghanistan renders the actions of the former "imputable to
the state of Afghanistan. "332 The international community generally
accepted this conclusion and condoned the United States military's
campaign against the Taliban.333 In many instances, however, the
relationship between a terrorist network and a state sponsor of its activities
is tenuous at best.334 The court, however, ignored direct evidence that
current and previous Palestinian attacks can be imputed to several Middle
Eastern nations that harbor, finance, and support Palestinian terrorist
activities.335
3. Nonviolent Actions and Self-Defense
Anticipatory self-defense measures generally contemplate actions
involving the use of force.336 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the
use of force, "a peremptory norm from which no derogation is
331. Brown, supra note 315, at 3. Furthermore, "[w]hen a terrorist organization operates in
a state illegally . . . customary international law imposes on states the duty" to prevent the
commission of "wrongful acts." Id. at 30; see infra note 332 and accompanying text.
332. Guruli, supra note 266, at 109. The U.S. directed its campaign against Afghanistan
because the Taliban government both supported and protected al Qaeda leadership. Becker, supra
note 6, at 583. But see S.C. Res. 1373, supranote 280; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 280 (implying
that September 11 constituted armed attacks regardless of the status of the actors).
333. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
334. Guruli, supra note 266, at 109-10. "[E]vidence supporting [a] close link might not be
available prior to the use of force in self-defense," making it implausible to require that only a state
actor may engage in an armed attack before the targeted state can invoke Article 51. Id. at 110.
Such a conclusion suggests that "he who chooses to wait [for legal authorization] will... pay an
unjust penalty before he can exact ajust penalty." Louis Ren6 Beres, In a Dark Time: The Expected
Consequences of an India-PakistanNuclear War, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 497, 505 n.24 (1998)
(quoting HuGo GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 96 (James Brown Scott
ed., Gladys L. William & W. H. Zeydel trans., 1964)).
335. Scholars have identified numerous connections between terrorists and states, including
financial aid and weapons. Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's "Legal"Response to
Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 598 (1989); see also Bayefsky, supra note 291 (noting that
Iran and Syria's support of Palestinian suicide bombers "apparently slipped the judges' minds");
Daoud Kuttab, Saddam and Palestine,JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at 13 (noting Iraq's cash
payments to every suicide bomber's family). The conflict has been fueled and perpetuated by forces
external to Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. See Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between
DemocraticStates and TerroristOrganizations:Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'LL. 389, 447-48
(2003).
336. See generally Brown, supranote 315 (arguing that the September 11 attacks established
a new paradigm relating to the international law principles governing a state's use of force).
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' Whereas the United States exercises force in its campaign
permitted."337
to eradicate terror, Israel's counterterrorism initiative represents a "nonforcible" measure.338 The court never addressed the nonviolent character
of the structure itself.33 9 Judge Higgins determined that Article 51 did not
contemplate the use of a nonforcible measure, such as a barrier, fence, or
wall, as an exercise of self-defense.34 ° As a result, the court implicitly
favored the exercise of force over endorsement of a state's implementation
of nonviolent measures designed to enhance its citizens' safety and
security."'

VII. CONCLUSION

For the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
General Assembly invoked its authority to call upon the Hague Court to
determine the legality of Israel's construction of its security structure.342
The court's advisory opinion reflected the extent to which anti-Israel
sentiment has clouded judicial reasoning34 3 as the U.N. practice of
"blam[ing] Israel first" 344 manifested itself through a proceeding during
which the court "bound" itself to "censure" Israel and dismantle its efforts
to combat terrorism.3 45 Although Israel represents one of approximately

337. Legal Consequences,supra note 63, at 1087 (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby). Article
2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force is "the most important principle that emerged in the twentieth
century." Id. (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby); see also Nabil Elaraby, The United Nations
Charterand the Use ofForce: Is Article 2(4) Still Workable?: Comment by Nabil Elaraby,78 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 94, 94 (1984) (stating that "[t]he use of force must not be sanctioned under
any circumstances").
338. See McCarthy, supra note 225, at 22.
339. Instead, the court stated, "The wall severs the territorial sphere over which the Palestinian
people are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination .... Legal Consequences, supra
note 63, at 1041 (quoting a written statement submitted to the court).
340. Id. at 1063 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). Judge Higgins added, "I remain
unconvinced that non-forcible measures... fall within self-defence under Article 51 .... [E]ven
if it were an act of self-defence... it would need to be justified as necessary and proportionate."
Id. (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). But see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
341. Such a conclusion "encourages lethal retaliation when more humane measures might
suffice." McCarthy, supra note 225, at 23; see also William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend
Them ": A NaturalLaw Justificationfor the Bush Doctrineof Preventative War, 79 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 1365, 1433-34 (2004) ("Grotius implied the fundamental right of state self-defense at
natural law to undertake . . . preventative measures" only after peaceful remedies were
"exhausted.").
342. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
343. "The Arab drive to destroy the state of Israel has debased the U.N.... perverted the
meaning of human rights, and ransacked international law and its highest Court." Bayefsky, supra
note 291.
344. Glick, supra note 213.
345. McCarthy, supra note 225, at 24.
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190 nations within the U.N., it has been isolated,34 6 defamed,3 47 and
rebuked348 by the organization and its highest court.34 9 Israel's
counterterrorism initiative serves solely as a prophylactic measure
designed to isolate Palestinian suicide bombers and insulate Israeli citizens
from violence.35 ° While its counterterrorism initiative imposes hardships
upon both Israelis and Palestinians,351 Israel's primary objective has been
to preserve lives on both sides of the conflict. 352 The court, however,
determined that Israel's security structure violated the rights of
Palestinians.353
The court's advisory opinion, which relied exclusively upon material
provided by the U.N., 354 failed to engage in an impartial assessment of the
conflict. Instead, the Court engaged in revisionist history,355 advanced
flawed legal reasoning,356 and succumbed to the same elements of bias and
anti-Israel sentiment expressed within the General Assembly. 357 Presented
with a legally conclusive question framed to produce a predetermined
answer, 358 the court advanced an interpretation of legal principles that
achieved the result sought by the General Assembly: Israel's attempts to
shield itself from terror violated international law.359
In an advisory opinion designed to substantiate the illegality of Israel's
security structure, the Hague Court manipulated principles of international
law in order to undermine Israel's inherent right to defend itself against
acts of terror. 360 The unanticipated ramification of the court's newly

346.
347.
348.
349.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.D.
"[T]he Court's decision w[as] crafted to apply to a party of one." Bayefsky, supra note

291.
350. See supra Part lI.B.
351. Palestinians "need freedom of movement ....Israeli Jews and... Arabs have a human
right not to be blown to pieces by suicide bombers." Wedgwood, supra note 63.
352. "[S]aving lives is more important than preserving the quality of life," which "is always
amenable to improvement. Death is permanent." Netanyahu, supra note 283. But see supra notes
340-41 and accompanying text.
353. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1054-55.
354. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
355. The court noted that Palestinian Arabs rejected the 1947 U.N. Partition Resolution
because "it was unbalanced." Legal Consequences,supranote 63, at 1030. But see supra note 102
and accompanying text.
356. The decision was described as one emanating from a "kangaroo court." Krauthammer,
supra note 283; see also Editorial, Europeand the ICJ,JERUSALEM POST, July 12, 2004, at 13.
357. The court's opinion "joins the parade of anti-Semitic infamy." Saul Singer, ICJto Israel:
Drop Dead,JERUSALEM POST, July 16, 2004, at 20.
358. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. The General Assembly "simply want[ed] to
know 'the legal consequences' of Israel's original sin." Wedgwood, supra note 63.
359. See Legal Consequences, supra note 63, at 1054-55.
360. The court's decision "raises still broader questions about the U.N.'s capacity to contribute
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established precedent may preclude a nation targeted by terror from
responding to and preventing security threats against its citizens. 6 Thus,
while the General Assembly may have sought to censure Israel by seeking
an advisory opinion from the court, it effectively undermined all U.N.
member nations' rights to self-defense.362

to any serious international effort against terrorism." Rabkin, supra note 297.
361. See supra Part VI.B.
362. Bayefsky, supra note 291.
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